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Abstract
We consider the problem of designing a revenue-optimal mechanism in the
two-item, single-buyer, unit-demand setting when the buyer’s valuations,
(z1, z2), are uniformly distributed in an arbitrary rectangle [c, c+b1]× [c, c+
b2] in the positive quadrant. We provide a complete and explicit solution for
arbitrary nonnegative values of (c, b1, b2). We identify five simple structures,
each with at most five (possibly stochastic) menu items, and prove that the
optimal mechanism has one of the five structures. We also characterize the
optimal mechanism as a function of b1, b2, and c. When c is low, the optimal
mechanism is a posted price mechanism with an exclusion region; when c
is high, it is a posted price mechanism without an exclusion region. Our
results are the first to show the existence of optimal mechanisms with no
exclusion region, to the best of our knowledge.
Keywords: Game theory, Economics, Optimal Auctions, Stochastic
Orders, Convex Optimization.
1. Introduction
This paper studies the design of revenue-optimal mechanism in the two-
item, one-buyer, unit-demand setting. The solution to the problem is well
known when the buyer’s value is one-dimensional (Myerson [28]). The
problem however becomes much harder when the buyer’s value is multi-
dimensional. Though many partial results are available in the literature,
finding the general solution remains open in the two-item setting, be it with
or without the unit-demand constraint.
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In this paper, we consider the problem of optimal mechanism design
in the two-item one-buyer unit-demand setting, when the valuations of the
buyer are uniformly distributed in arbitrary rectangles in the positive quad-
rant having their left-bottom corners on the line z1 = z2. Observe that this
is a setting that occurs often in practice. As one example, consider a setting
where two houses in a locality are sold. The seller is aware of a minimum
and a maximum value for each house. Further, the buyer has a unit-demand,
i.e., he can buy at most one of the houses, but submits his bids for both the
houses. We consider that the buyer’s valuations are uniform in the rectan-
gle formed by those intervals. We compute the optimal mechanism for all
cases when the minimum value for both the houses is the same. Another
example is one where two sports team franchises in a sports league are sold
to a potential buyer. The buyer needs at most one franchise, but submits
his bids for both franchises.
1.1. Prior work
Consider the setting where the buyer is not restricted by the unit-demand
constraint. Daskalakis et al. [16, 17, 18] provided a solution when the buyer’s
valuation vector z arises from a rich class of distribution functions each of
which gives rise to a so-called “well-formed canonical partition” of the sup-
port set of the distribution. The authors of these papers formulate this
problem as an optimization problem, identify its dual as a problem of op-
timal transport, and exploit its solution to obtain a primal solution. Gi-
annakopoulos and Koutsoupias [22] computed the solution for the multi-
item setting, but only when the valuations for each item are uniformly
distributed in [0, 1]. Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias [23] also provided
closed form solutions in the two-item setting, when the distribution satisfies
some sufficient conditions, by using a dual approach similar to [16, 18, 19].
In a companion paper [36] (see also [35]), we used the same approach of
solving the optimal transport problem as in [18] to obtain the solution
when z ∼ Unif[c1, c1 + b1] × [c2, c2 + b2] for arbitrary nonnegative values
of (c1, c2, b1, b2). The exact solution in the unrestricted setting has largely
been computed using the dual approach designed in [18].
The exact solution in the unit-demand setting, on the other hand, has
been computed using various other methods. Pavlov [32] obtained a solution
both in the unrestricted setting and in the restricted setting of unit-demand
constraint, when z ∼ Unif[c, c+1]2. The above paper used a marginal profit
function V , whose properties are analogous to the virtual valuation func-
tion in [28], to compute the exact solution. We thus call this method the
virtual valuation method. The function however depends on the region of
zero allocation, the exclusion region, and is thus not as straightforward to
compute as the virtual valuation function in [28] for the single item case.
Lev [27] provided a solution for the unit-demand setting when the distribu-
tion is uniform in certain polygons aligned with the co-ordinate axes; the
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approach involves analyzing the utility function of the optimal mechanism
at the edges of the polygon. Kash and Frongillo [25] identified the dual
when the valuation space is convex and the space of allocations is restricted.
They also solved examples when the allocations are restricted to satisfy ei-
ther the unit-demand constraint or the deterministic constraint. Other than
this lone example solved in [25], we are not aware of any work that computes
the exact solution in the unit-demand setting using the duality approach.
There are interesting characterization results on optimal mechanisms
in the unit-demand setting. Wang and Tang [37], [34] proved that when
the distributions are uniform in any rectangle in the positive quadrant, the
optimal mechanism is a menu with at most five items. However, the exact
menus and associated allocations were left open. Haghpanah and Hartline
[24] did a reverse mechanism design; they constructed a mechanism and
identified conditions under which there exists a virtual valuation thereby
establishing that the mechanism is optimal.
There has been some interest in finding approximately optimal solutions
when the distribution of the buyer’s valuations satisfies certain conditions.
See [3–15], [20], [21], [38] for relevant literature on approximate solutions.
In this paper however we shall focus on exact solutions.
1.2. Our contributions
Our contributions are as follows:
(i) We identify the dual to the problem of optimal auction in the restricted
unit-demand setting, using a result in [25]1. We then argue that the
computation of the dual measure in the unit-demand setting using
the approach of optimal transport in [18] is intricate. Specifically, we
consider three examples, z ∼ Unif[1.26, 2.26]2 , z ∼ Unif[1.5, 2.5]2 , and
z ∼ Unif[0, 1]× [0, 1.2], and show that the optimal dual variable differs
significantly with variation in c, thus making it hard to discover the
correct dual measure.
(ii) Motivated by the above, we explore the virtual valuation method in
[32] and nontrivially extend this method to compute the exact solution
when z ∼ Unif[c, c+ b1]× [c, c+ b2], for arbitrary nonnegative values of
(c, b1, b2). We establish that the structure of the optimal mechanism
falls within a class of five simple structures, each having at most five
constant allocation regions. We also make some remarks on the general
case [c1, c1 + b1]× [c2, c2 + b2].
(iii) To the best of our knowledge, our results appear to be the first to show
the existence of optimal mechanisms with no region of exclusion (see
Figures 2e and 2g). The results in Armstrong [1] and Barelli et al. [2]
1The dual to the problem of optimal auction was derived independently in the PhD
thesis of the first author.
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assert that the optimal multi-dimensional mechanisms have a nontriv-
ial exclusion region under some sufficient conditions on the distribu-
tions and the utility functions. Armstrong [1] assumes strict convexity
of the support set, and Barelli et al. [2] assume strict concavity of the
utility function in the allocations. Neither of these assumptions holds
in our setting.
In the literature, we already have qualitative results on the structure of
optimal mechanism for distributions satisfying certain conditions. For in-
stance, Pavlov [31] considered distributions with negative power rate, while
Wang and Tang [37] considered uniform distributions on arbitrary rectangles
(which do have negative power rate). Our work considers uniform distribu-
tions with support set [c, c + b1] × [c, c + b2], a special case of the settings
in [31] and [37]. It follows that the optimal mechanisms in our setting can
have allocations only of the form (0, 0), (a, 1−a) in accordance with Pavlov’s
result, and the menus can have at most five items in accordance with Wang
and Tang’s result.
Though our work is on a further special case, we are able to obtain finer
results. We prove that the optimal mechanisms can only be one among the
structures depicted in Figures 2a–2g. Our results bring out some unexpected
structures such as those in Figures 2e and 2g. Furthermore, our results
are explicit in that we can compute the optimal mechanism for uniform
distributions on any rectangle of the form [c, c+ b1]× [c, c+ b2].
The optimal mechanisms for various values of (c, b1, b2) are mentioned in
Theorem 12. The phase diagram in Figure 1 represents how the structure
of optimal mechanism changes when the values of (c, b1, b2) change. We
interpret the solutions and highlight their features as follows.
• Beyond the exclusion (no sale) region, the allocation probabilities are
the same for all z falling in the same 45◦ line (Theorem 9). Observe
that this is in sharp contrast with the unrestricted setting, where the
allocation probabilities are the same either for all z falling in the same
vertical line or the same horizontal line (see [35, Fig. 1–3]). This is
because, in the unit-demand case, the buyer demands at most one of
the two items, and thus the seller decides the item to be sold based on
the difference of valuations on the items2.
• Consider the case when c is low. The seller then knows that the buyer
possibly could have very low valuations, and thus sets a high price
(c + δi) to sell item i. Observe that this is a posted price mechanism
2The item to be sold is decided based on the difference in valuations only for cases
where q1 + q2 = 1 holds everywhere outside the exclusion region. It would be interesting
to interpret the results for cases when q1 + q2 < 1 can occur outside the exclusion region,
but this exploration is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Figure 1: A phase diagram of the optimal mechanism when b2 ≤ b1 ≤ (2.2)b2.
with prices c+ δ1 and c+ δ2 for items 1 and 2 respectively (see Figure
2a).
• When c increases, the seller now finds it optimal to set a second price
over and above the first price c + δi. He offers a lottery for the first
price, and offers an individual item for the second and higher price
(see Figures 2b and 2c).
• When c increases further, the seller sells item i only when zi is very
high compared to z−i. In case the difference is not sufficiently high,
then the seller finds it optimal to allocate randomly one or the other
item (see Figures 2d and 2f).
• When c is very high, the revenue gained by exclusion of certain val-
uations is always dominated by the revenue lost by it, and thus the
seller finds no reason to withhold the items for any valuation profile3.
So the optimal mechanism turns out to be a posted price mechanism
with prices c+ b13 +max(0,
b1
6 − b24 ) and c for items 1 and 2 respectively.
In effect, it is a posted price mechanism with no exclusion region (see
Figures 2e and 2g).
• Starting at c = 0, consider moving the support set rectangle to infinity.
Then, the optimal mechanism starts as a posted price mechanism with
an exclusion region, and ends up again as a posted price mechanism
3We refer the reader to Remark 7 for a more precise explanation.
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Figure 2: An illustration of all possible structures that an optimal mechanism can have.
but without an exclusion region. The other structures in Figures 2b–
2d, and Figure 2f are optimal for various intermediate values.
1.3. Our method
Our method is as follows. We initially formulate the problem at hand
(in the unit-demand setting) into an optimization problem, and compute its
dual using a result in [25]. The dual problem turns out to be an optimal
transport problem that transfers mass from the support set D to itself. Mass
transfer must occur subject to the constraint that the difference between
the mass densities transferred out of and transferred into the set convex-
dominates a signed measure that depends only on the distribution of the
valuations. The dual problem is similar to that in [18] for the unrestricted
setting, but differs in the transportation cost.
The key challenge in solving the dual problem lies in constructing the
“shuffling measure” that convex-dominates 0, and in finding the location in
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the support set D where the shuffling measure sits. The shuffling measure
was always added at fixed locations in the unrestricted setting, and had a
fixed structure for the uniform distribution of valuations over any rectangle
in the positive quadrant (see [35]). In the unit-demand setting, however, we
see that both the locations and the structures of the shuffling measure vary
significantly for different values of c. There is as yet no clear understanding
on how to construct the shuffling measure, and hence on how to compute
the optimal solution via the dual method.
Motivated by the above, we explore the virtual valuation method used
by Pavlov [32]. Pavlov [32] computed the optimal mechanism when the
buyer’s valuations are given by z ∼ Unif[c, c + 1]2; the optimal mechanism
was obtained only for distributions that are symmetric across the two items.
When compared with the case of symmetric distributions, the case of asym-
metric distributions poses the following challenge. The optimal mechanism
is symmetric along a diagonal in the case of symmetric distributions. For
asymmetric distributions, the mechanism must be computed over the larger
region of the entire support set. The asymmetry leads to more parameters,
more conditions to check for optimality, and a more complex variety of so-
lutions determined, as we will soon see, by a larger number of polynomials.
All these make the computation more difficult.
In this paper, we demonstrate how to compute the optimal mechanism
for asymmetric distributions, when z ∼ Unif[c, c+b1]×[c, c+b2]. Specifically,
we do the following.
• Taking cue from the result in [37] that the optimal mechanism is a
menu with at most five items, we first construct some possible menus,
parametrized by at most four parameters.
• We find the relation between the parameters using the sufficient condi-
tions on the marginal profit function V . We show that the parameters
can be computed by simultaneously solving at most two polynomials,
each of degree at most 4.
• We then use continuity of the polynomials to prove that there exists
a solution having desired values for all parameters. We then prove
that the optimal mechanism has one of the five simple structures for
arbitrary nonnegative values of (c, b1, b2) (see Theorem 12).
• We conjecture that the optimal mechanisms have a similar structure
even when z ∈ [c1, c1 + b1]× [c2, c2 + b2] for all (c1, c2, b1, b2) ≥ 0. We
provide preliminary results to justify the conjecture (see Theorem 17).
Proofs of some case use Mathematica to verify certain algebraic inequal-
ities. This is because (i) the parameters turn out to be solutions that simul-
taneously satisfy two polynomials of degree at most 4; and (ii) the solutions
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are complicated functions of (c, b1, b2) involving fifth roots and eighth roots
of some expressions. Verifying that these expressions satisfy some bounds
were automated via the Mathematica software. The results that use Math-
ematica have been marked with an asterisk in the statement of Theorem 12.
We believe that all of these results can be proved in the strict mathematical
sense; but we leave this for the future in the interest of timely dissemination
of our conclusions and observations. The skeptical reader could proceed by
interpreting the Mathematica-based conclusions as conjectures.
Our work thus provides insights into two well-known approaches to solve
representative problems on optimal mechanisms in the multi-item setting,
besides solving, in the process, one such problem for asymmetric distri-
butions. Specifically, our work clarifies under what situations the duality
approach is likely to work well, and the intrinsic difficulties in using that ap-
proach in some other settings. Furthermore, the special cases that we solve
provide insights into various possible structures of the optimal mechanisms
which, we feel, would act as a guideline to solve the problem of computing
good menus in practical settings. We believe that our work is an important
step towards understanding the applicability of the two different approaches,
and a useful step addition to the growing canvas of canonical problems in
multi-dimensional optimal auctions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we first
formulate an optimization problem under the unit-demand setting. We next
compute its dual using a result in [25], and solve it for three representative
examples of (c, b1, b2). The main purpose behind these examples is to bring
out the variety in structure, and therefore the difficulty in guessing and
computing, the dual measure for more general settings. In Section 3, we
nontrivially extend the virtual valuation method of [32] to provide a complete
and explicit solution for the case of asymmetric distributions. In particular,
we prove that the optimal mechanism has one of the five simple structures.
In Section 4, we conjecture, with promising preliminary results, that the
optimal mechanism when the valuations are uniformly distributed in an
arbitrary rectangle [c1, c1 + b1]× [c2, c2 + b2] also has similar structures. In
Section 5, we conclude the paper and provide some directions for future
work.
2. Exploring The Dual Approach
Consider a two-item, single-buyer, unit-demand setting. The buyer’s
valuation is z = (z1, z2) for the two items, sampled according to the joint
density f(z) = f1(z1)f2(z2), where f1(z1) and f2(z2) are marginal densities.
The support set of f is defined as D := {z : f(z) > 0}. Throughout the
paper, we considerD = [c, c+b1]×[c, c+b2], where (c, b1, b2) are nonnegative.
Our aim is to design a revenue-optimal mechanism. By the revelation
principle [29, Prop. 9.25], it suffices to focus only on direct mechanisms.
8
Further, we focus on mechanisms where the buyer has a quasilinear util-
ity. Specifically, we assume an allocation function q : D → {(q1, q2) :
0 ≤ q1, q2, q1 + q2 ≤ 1} and a payment function t : D → R+ that repre-
sent, respectively, the probabilities of allocation of the items to the buyer
and the amount of transfer from the buyer to the seller. If the buyer’s
true valuation is z, and he reports zˆ, his realized (quasilinear) utility is
uˆ(z, zˆ) := z · q(zˆ) − t(zˆ), which is the expected value of the lottery he re-
ceives minus the payment.
A mechanism (q, t) satisfies incentive compatibility (IC) when truth telling
is a weakly dominant strategy for the buyer, i.e., uˆ(z, z) ≥ uˆ(z, zˆ) for ev-
ery z, zˆ ∈ D. In this case the buyer’s realized utility is u(z) := uˆ(z, z) =
z · q(z)− t(z). An incentive compatible mechanism satisfies individual ratio-
nality (IR) if the buyer is not worse off by participating in the mechanism,
i.e., u(z) ≥ 0 for every z ∈ D, with zero being the buyer’s utility if he
chooses not to participate.
The following result is well known:
Theorem 1. [33] . A mechanism (q, t), with u(z) = z · q(z)− t(z), is incen-
tive compatible if and only if u is continuous, convex and ∇u(z) = q(z) for
a.e. z ∈ D.
An optimal mechanism is one that maximizes the expected revenue to the
seller subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality (Krishna
[26, p. 67]). By virtue of Theorem 1, an optimal mechanism solves the
problem
max
u
∫
D
(z · ∇u(z)− u(z))f(z) dz
subject to (a)u continuous, convex,
(b)∇u(z) ∈ [0, 1]2,∇u(z) · 1 ∈ [0, 1], a.e. z ∈ D,
(c)u(z) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ D.
Using the arguments in [19, Sec. 2.1], we simplify the aforementioned prob-
lem as
max
u
∫
D
(z · ∇u(z)− (u(z) − u(c, c)))f(z) dz (1)
subject to (a)u continuous, convex,
(b)∇u(z) ∈ [0, 1]2,∇u(z) · 1 ∈ [0, 1], a.e. z ∈ D.
We now further simplify the objective function of the problem. Using in-
tegration by parts, the objective function can be written as
∫
D u(z)µ(z) dz+∫
∂D u(z)µs(z) dz + u(c, c)µp(c, c), where the functions µ, µs, and µp are de-
9
fined as
µ(z) := −z · ∇f(z)− 3f(z), z ∈ D,
µs(z) := (z · n(z))f(z), z ∈ ∂D, (2)
µp(z) := δ{(c,c)}(z).
The vector n(z) is the normal to the surface ∂D at z if it is defined, and
0 otherwise (at corners). We regard µ as the density of a signed measure
on the support set D that is absolutely continuous with respect to (w.r.t.)
the two-dimensional Lebesgue measure, and µs as the density of a signed
measure on ∂D that is absolutely continuous w.r.t. the surface Lebesgue
measure. We shall refer to both Lebesgue measures as dz. We regard µp as
a point measure of unit mass at the specified point. The notation δ denotes
the Dirac-delta function. So µp(z) = 1 if z = (c, c), and 0 otherwise. By
taking u(z) = 1 ∀z ∈ D, we observe that∫
D
µ(z) dz +
∫
∂D
µs(z) dz + µp(c, c)
=
∫
D
u(z)µ(z) dz +
∫
∂D
u(z)µs(z) dz + u(c, c)µp(c, c)
=
∫
D
(z · ∇u(z)− u(z))f(z) dz + u(c, c)
=
∫
D
(0− 1)f(z) dz + u(c, c) = 0. (3)
We now define the measure µ¯, supported on set D, as
µ¯(A) :=
∫
D
1A(z)µ(z) dz +
∫
∂D
1A(z)µs(z) dz + µp(A ∩ (c, c))
for all measurable sets A. We thus observe that µ¯(D) = 0. Observe that µ¯
is a signed Radon measure in D, and that the functions µ and µs are just
the Radon-Nikodym derivatives of the respective components of µ¯ w.r.t.
the two-dimensional and one-dimensional Lebesgue measures respectively.
Based on the discussion in the paragraph after (1), the objective function
of problem (1) can now be written as
∫
D u dµ¯.
We now rewrite the constraint (b) in problem (1) as the following three
constraints.
u(z1, z2)− u(z′1, z2) ≤ (z1 − z′1)+, ∀z1, z′1 ∈ D1, ∀z2 ∈ D2,
u(z1, z2)− u(z1, z′2) ≤ (z2 − z′2)+, ∀z1 ∈ D1, ∀z2, z′2 ∈ D2,
u(z1, z2)− u(z′1, z2 − z1 + z′1) ≤ (z1 − z′1)+, ∀z1, z′1 ∈ D1, ∀z2 ∈ D2,
where (·)+ = max(0, ·). Observe that these three constraints are equivalent
to
u(z)− u(z′) ≤ max((z1 − z′1)+, (z2 − z′2)+), ∀z, z′ ∈ D.
10
So the optimization problem can now be written as
max
u
∫
D
u dµ¯ (4)
subject to (a)u continuous, convex, increasing,
(b)u(z) − u(z′) ≤ ‖z − z′‖∞, ∀z, z′ ∈ D.
Note that the objective function of the problem satisfies
∫
D t(z)f(z) dz =∫
D u dµ¯; thus the µ¯-measure can be interpreted as the marginal contribution
of the utility u to the revenue of the seller.
We now recall the definition of the convex ordering relation. A function
f is increasing if z ≥ z′ component-wise implies f(z) ≥ f(z′).
Definition 2. (See for e.g., [17]) Let α and β be measures defined on a set
D. We say α convex-dominates β (α cvx β) if
∫
D f dα ≥
∫
D f dβ for all
continuous, convex and increasing f .
One can understand convex dominance as follows: A risk-seeking buyer4.,
with u as his utility function (increasing and convex), will choose the lottery
α over β if α convex-dominates β.
The dual problem of (4) is found to be [25, Thm. 3.1].
min
γ
∫
D×D
‖z − z′‖∞ dγ(z, z′) (5)
subject to (a) γ ∈ Radon+(D ×D),
(b) γ(·,D) = γ1, γ(D, ·) = γ2, γ1 − γ2 cvx µ¯.
By γ ∈ Radon+(D × D), we mean that γ is an unsigned Radon measure
in D ×D. The dual is computed by using the following expressions in the
statement of [25, Thm. 3.1]: (i) lS(z, z
′) = ‖z−z′‖∞, and (ii) U(D,S) is the
set of all utility functions that are continuous, convex, and increasing. We
derive the weak duality result in Appendix C to provide an understanding
of how the dual arises and why γ may be interpreted as prices for violating
the primal constraint.
The next lemma gives a sufficient condition for strong duality.
Lemma 3. [25, Cor. 4.1] Let u∗ and γ∗ be feasible for the aforementioned
primal (4) and dual (5) problems, respectively. Then the objective functions
of (4) and (5) with u = u∗ and γ = γ∗ are equal if and only if (i)
∫
D u
∗ d(γ∗1−
γ∗2) =
∫
D u
∗ dµ¯, and (ii) u∗(z)− u∗(z′) = ‖z − z′‖∞, hold γ∗−a.e.
4This is to be contrasted with second-order stochastic dominance which says that α
second-order dominates β (denoted as α 2 β) if a risk-averse buyer with an increasing and
concave utility function prefers α to β. Mathematically, convex dominance and second-
order stochastic dominance are related inversely under some conditions. More specifically,
α cvx β ⇔ α 2 β if (i) D is a bounded rectangle in the positive orthant and (ii)∫
D
‖x‖1 d(α− β) = 0 [17, Lem. 8]
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We now present a few examples to indicate why it is hard to compute
the optimal mechanism using this dual approach. We first compute the
components of µ¯ (i.e., µ, µs, µp), with f(z) =
1
b1b2
for z ∈ D = [c, c + b1] ×
[c, c+ b2], from (2), as
(area density) µ(z) = −3/(b1b2), z ∈ D,
(line density) µs(z) =
2∑
i=1
(−c1(zi = c) + (c+ bi)1(zi = c+ bi))/(b1b2),
z ∈ ∂D,
(point measure)µp(z) = δ{(c,c)}(z). (6)
In the examples that we consider, we start by suggesting a certain mech-
anism, and prove that it is indeed the optimal mechanism by constructing
a feasible u and a feasible γ that satisfy the complementary slackness con-
straints of Lemma 3. While u can be constructed easily from the allocations
q, the construction of the transport variable γ needs some work. This in-
volves transporting mass from each point on the top and right boundaries of
D along the 45◦ line containing the point. We shuffle the measure across the
points on the boundary in case there is an excess or a deficit. The construc-
tion of the shuffling measure is the main challenge; it differs significantly
across the examples we consider. We now fill in the details.
2.1. Example 1: z ∼ Unif [1.26, 2.26]2
Theorem 4. [32] Consider the case when c = 1.26, and b1 = b2 = 1. Then,
the optimal mechanism is as depicted in Figure 3a, with δ1 = δ2 = 20/63
and a1 = a2 = a = 0.6615.
Proof. Pavlov [32] proved this via virtual valuations. We shall use the dual
method. To prove this theorem, we must find a feasible u and a feasible
γ, and show that they satisfy the conditions of Lemma 3. We define the
allocation q as given in Figure 3a. The primal variable u can be derived by
fixing u(c, c) = 0 and by using the allocation variable q, since ∇u = q.
We now define functions α(1), β(1) : D → R as follows (see Figures 4a
and 4b).
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Figure 3: Optimal mechanism when b1 = b2 = 1 and (a) c = 1.26, (b) c = 1.5.
α(1)(c+ t, c+ t′) : =
{
3t− 1 (t, t′) ∈ [0, 2/3] × {1},
0 otherwise.
(7)
β(1)(c+ t, c+ t′) : =


3t− 1 (t, t′) ∈ [2/3, 1 − δ2]× {1},
3t+ 3a(1− t− δ2)− c− 1 (t, t′) ∈ [1− δ2, 1]× {1},
0 otherwise.
(8)
The functions α(2) and β(2) are defined similarly on the intervals ({c+1} ×
[c, c + 2/3]) and ({c + 1} × [c + 2/3, c + 1]) respectively. Observe that α(i)
and β(i) are densities (Radon-Nikodym derivatives) of measures that are
absolutely continuous w.r.t. the surface Lebesgue measure. The measures
themselves are denoted α¯(i) and β¯(i), respectively.
We now construct the dual variable γ as follows. First, let (i) γ1 := γ
Z
1 +
γ
D\Z
1 , where Z is the exclusion region; (ii) γ
Z
1 = µ¯
Z , the µ¯measure restricted
to Z; and (iii) γ
D\Z
1 = (µ¯
D\Z +
∑
i(α¯
(i) + β¯(i)))+. So γ1 is supported on
Z ∪ ([1.26, 2.26] × {2.26}) ∪ ({2.26} × [1.26, 2.26]). We define γs1 as the
Radon-Nikodym derivative of γ1 w.r.t. the surface Lebesgue measure. It is
easy to see that γs1(z) = µs(z) +
∑
i(α
(i)(z) + β(i)(z)) when z ∈ (Z ∩D) ∪
([1.26, 2.26] × {2.26}) ∪ ({2.26} × [1.26, 2.26]), and zero otherwise. We now
specify a transition probability kernel γ(· | x) for all x in the support of γ1.
(a) For x ∈ Z, we define γ(y | x) = δx(y). This is interpreted as no mass
being transferred.
(b) For x ∈ ([1.26, 2.26]×{2.26})∪({2.26}×[1.26, 2.26]), we define γ(y | x) =
(µ(y) + µs(y))−/γs1(x) if y ∈ {y ∈ D\Z : y1 − y2 = x1 − x2}, and zero
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Figure 4: (a) The measure α(1). (b) The measure β(1).
otherwise. This is interpreted as a transfer of γs1(x) from the boundary
point x to (the 45◦ line segment) {y ∈ D\Z : y1−y2 = x1−x2}, which
has x as one end-point.
We then define γ(F ) =
∫
(x,y)∈F γ1(dx)γ(dy | x) for any measurable F ∈
D × D. It is now easy to check that γZ2 = µ¯Z , and γD\Z2 = (µ¯D\Z +∑
i(α¯
(i) + β¯(i)))−. Thus we have (γ1 − γ2)Z = 0, and (γ1 − γ2)D\Z =
µ¯D\Z +
∑
i(α¯
(i) + β¯(i)).
We now verify that γ is feasible. Observe that the components of µ¯Z
are positive only at the left-bottom corner of D (i.e., at (c, c)) and negative
elsewhere, and that µ¯+(Z) = 1 = µ¯−(Z) (the second equality requires some
calculations). So we have
∫
Z f dµ¯ ≤ 0 for any increasing function f , and thus
µ¯Z cvx 0 = (γ1 − γ2)Z . We next prove that (γ1 − γ2)D\Z cvx µ¯D\Z . Since
(γ1−γ2−µ¯)D\Z =
∑
i(α¯
(i)+β¯(i)), it suffices to prove that
∑
i(α¯
(i)+β¯(i)) cvx
0. We do this in the next lemma.
Lemma 5. (i) The measure α¯(1) is such that α¯(1)([1.26, 1.26 + 2/3] ×
{2.26}) = 0 and ∫ 1.26+2/31.26 (t−1.26) α¯(1)(dt, 2.26) ≥ 0. Hence for any f
constant on [1.26, 1.26+2/3], we have
∫ 1.26+2/3
1.26 f(t) dα¯
(1)(dt, 2.26) = 0.
Further, α¯(1) cvx 0. A similar result holds for α¯(2).
(ii) β¯(1)([1.26+2/3, 2.26]×{2.26}) = 0 and ∫ 2.261.26+2/3(t−1.26) β¯(1)(dt, 2.26) =
0. Hence we have
∫ 2.26
1.26+2/3 f(t) β¯
(1)(dt, 2.26) = 0 for any affine f on
[1.26+2/3, 2.26]. Further, β¯(1) cvx 0. A similar result holds for β¯(2).
Proof. See Appendix A. 
We have thus established that γ1 − γ2 cvx 0. We now verify if u and γ
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satisfy the conditions in Lemma 3.
∫
D
u d(γ1 − γ2) =
∫
Z
u d(γ1 − γ2) +
∫
D\Z
u d(γ1 − γ2)
=
∫
D\Z
u d
(
µ¯+
∑
i
(α¯(i) + β¯(i))
)
=
∫
D\Z
u dµ¯ =
∫
D
u dµ¯,
where the second equality holds because (γ1 − γ2)Z = 0; the third equality
holds because u(z) is a constant when z ∈ ([1.26, 1.26 + 2/3] × {2.26}) ∪
({2.26}× [1.26, 1.26+2/3]), and u(z) is affine when z ∈ ([1.26+2/3, 2.26]×
{2.26}) ∪ ({2.26} × [1.26 + 2/3, 2.26]); and the last equality holds because
u(z) = 0 when z ∈ Z. To see why u(z) − u(z′) = ‖z − z′‖∞ holds γ-
a.e., it suffices to check this condition for those (z, z′) for which γ(· | z)
is nonzero, as in the cases (a) and (b) above. For z, z′ in (a), z = z′
and hence u(z) − u(z′) = 0; in (b), (z, z′) lie on a 45◦ line, and hence
u(z)−u(z′) = (z1−z′1) = (z2−z′2) = ‖z−z‖∞. Thus u(z)−u(z′) = ‖z−z′‖∞
holds γ-a.e. 
The dual measure γ was defined so that the measure γ1 − γ2 − µ¯, called
the shuffling measure, convex-dominates 0. Our key challenge in computing
the optimal mechanism lies in constructing the shuffling measure. In the
next example, we use a significantly different shuffling measure.
2.2. Example 2: z ∼ Unif [1.5, 2.5]2
Theorem 6. [32] Consider the case when c = 1.5, and b1 = b2 = 1. Then,
the optimal mechanism is as depicted in Figure 3b, with δ′1 = δ
′
2 =
√
5/3−1.
We use the shuffling measure λ¯+
∑
i(α¯
(i)+β¯(i)), defined as follows. We define
α(i) and β(i), the respective Radon-Nikodym derivatives of the measures α¯(i)
and β¯(i) w.r.t. the surface Lebesgue measure, as in (7) and (8) respectively,
but with δ1 = δ2 =
((3+
√
33)/8)−1
(27−3√33)/32 > δ
′
2 and a = (27 − 3
√
33)/32. We define
λ : D → R, the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the measure λ¯ w.r.t. the
surface Lebesgue measure, as follows (see Figure 5):
λ(c+ (t− 1 + δ2)/2, c + δ2 − (t− 1 + δ2)/2)
= λ(c+ δ2 − (t− 1 + δ2)/2, c + (t− 1 + δ2)/2) (9)
=
{
3a(t− 1 + δ2) + c t ∈ [1− δ2, 1− δ′2],
3t(a− 1/2) + 3/2(1 − δ′2)− 3a(1 − δ2) t ∈ [1− δ′2, 1].
λ is defined to be 0 at every other point in D. Observe that the function is
defined on the line z1 + z2 = 2c + δ2, and thus is symmetric about the line
z1 = z2.
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tL: λ(c + (t− 1 + δ2)/2, c + δ2 − (t− 1 + δ2)/2)
R: λ(c+ δ1 + (t− 1 + δ1)/2, c− (t− 1 + δ1)/2)
(1
−
δ 2
)
(1
−
δ′ 2
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(1
−
δ′ 1
)
(1
−
δ 1
)
c
Left Right
Figure 5: The measure λ. The y-axis expressions for the left and the right portions of the
graph are indicated using L and R. The measure is symmetric because we have δ1 = δ2.
We construct the dual measure using λ¯+
∑
i(α¯
(i)+ β¯(i)) as the shuffling
measure. Observe that the shuffling measure has a significantly different
structure compared to Example-1. For a detailed proof of the theorem, we
refer the reader to Appendix A.
The results of Theorems 4 and 6 are parts of a more general result shown
in [32]. Pavlov’s proof uses a virtual valuation method, but our proofs use
the dual approach. We now solve another example via the dual approach,
going beyond those considered in [32].
2.3. Example 3: z ∼ Unif [0, 1.2] × [0, 1]
Theorem 7. Consider the case when c = 0, b1 = 1.2, and b2 = 1. Then,
the optimal mechanism is as in Figure 6, with (δ1, δ2) simultaneously solving
− 3δ1δ2 − c(δ1 + δ2) + b1b2 = 0.
− 3
2
δ22 + 2b2δ2 −
b22
2
+ (c− 2b2 + 3δ2)δ1 = 0.
The values of (δ1, δ2) can be solved numerically to be
(δ1, δ2) ≈ (0.678837, 0.589243).
We construct the shuffling measure α¯ + α¯(o) + α¯(h) as follows, using its re-
spective Radon-Nikodym derivatives α, α(o), α(h) w.r.t. the surface Lebesgue
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measure. The superscripts (o) and (h) stand for ’oblique’ and ’horizontal’.
α(c+ t, c+ t′) : =
1
1.2


3t− 1 (t, t′) ∈ [0, 1 − δ2]× {1},
3(1 − δ2)− c− 1 (t, t′) ∈ [1− δ2, 1 + δ∗]× {1},
0 otherwise.
(10)
α(o)(c+ t, c+ t′) : =
1
1.2


3t− 1.2 (t, t′) ∈ {1.2} × [0, 1.2 − δ1],
2(1.2) − 3δ1 (t, t′) ∈ {1.2} × [1.2 − δ1, 1],
0 otherwise.
(11)
α(h)(c+ t, c+ t′) : =
1
1.2


3(t− δ1 + 0.2) (t, t′) ∈ {1.2} × [δ1 − 0.2, δ2],
3(0.2 − δ∗) (t, t′) ∈ {1.2} × [δ2, 2/3],
0 otherwise.
(12)
We construct the dual measure using α¯+α¯(o)+α¯(h) as the shuffling measure.
For a detailed proof of Theorem 7, see Appendix A. In point (d) of that
proof, mass from certain points on the right-hand side boundary will be
transferred to two line segments – a 45◦ line (oblique transfer via α(o))
and a horizontal line (via α(h)). Observe that the shuffling measure has a
significantly different structure compared to Examples 1 and 2.
(0, 0) (b1, 0)
(0, b2)
(0
,
δ
2
)
(δ1, 0)(δ
∗, 0)
(b2 + δ
∗, b2)
(0, 0)
(1, 0)
(0, 1)
Figure 6: Optimal mechanism when c =
0, b1 = 1.2, b2 = 1.
t
(
α(o) + α(h)
)
(1.2, t)
0
δ 1
−
0
.2
b 1
−
δ 1 δ 2 2
/
3 1
−1.2
Figure 7: The measure α(o) + α(h), for
c = 0, b1 = 1.2, b2 = 1.
We have computed the optimal mechanisms for three representative ex-
amples using the dual approach. The challenge in each of the examples
was to construct the appropriate shuffling measure γ1− γ2− µ¯ that convex-
dominates 0. We now make some observations on the constructed shuffling
measures.
• The locations of the shuffling measure exhibit significant variations in
our examples. For instance, the shuffling measure was non-zero only
at the top boundary and the right boundary of D in Theorems 4 and
7, whereas, it was non-zero additionally on the line z1 + z2 = 2c + δ2
in Theorem 6.
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• The structures of the shuffling measure also exhibit significant varia-
tions. The variations can be observed from the structures in Figures
5 and 7. This is in contrast to the unrestricted setting solved in [35],
where the shuffling measures were added at a fixed location and had
a fixed structure.
• In the case of c = 0, b1 = 1.2, b2 = 1, the shuffling measure had to be
constructed partly for a mass transfer along the 45◦ line segment, and
partly for a transfer along the horizontal line segment (see point (d)
in the proof of Theorem 7, Appendix A). The example thus had two
shuffling measures: α¯(o) and α¯(h).
The variability in the examples above makes it difficult for us to arrive
at a general algorithmic method to construct shuffling measures, even for
the restricted setting of uniform distributions. This motivates us to tackle
the general problem using the virtual valuation method in [32].
3. Exploring The Virtual Valuation Method
Recall that we consider the problem of optimal mechanism design in a
two-item, one-buyer, unit-demand setting. In this section, we compute the
optimal mechanism when the buyer’s valuation z ∼ Unif[c, c+b1]× [c, c+b2],
using the virtual valuation method in [32]. We start with the following
general result from [32].
Theorem 8. [32, Prop. 1] If the distribution f satisfies
3f1(z)f2(z) + z1f
′
1(z)f2(z) + z2f1(z)f
′
2(z) ≥ 0∀z ∈ D,
then the allocation function q in the optimal mechanism is such that q1+q2 ∈
{0, 1}.
Thus, if f satisfies the above sufficient condition, then for every z ∈ D\Z,
q(z) satisfies q1(z)+q2(z) = 1. Recall that Z is the exclusion region. Observe
that the sufficient condition in Theorem 8 is clearly satisfied for the uniform
distribution Unif[c, c + b1] × [c, c + b2]. The utility of the buyer in D\Z
can be written as u(z) = (z1 − z2)q1(z) + z2 − t(z), where we have used
q2 = 1− q1. Defining δ := z1 − z2, we have δ ∈ [−b2, b1] for the case under
consideration. The following theorem from [32] reduces the domains of q
and t from two-dimensions to one-dimension.
Theorem 9. [32, Prop. 2] In the optimal mechanism, the allocations and
the payments, (q, t), can be rewritten so that they are a constant for every
{z ∈ D\Z : z1 − z2 = δ}.
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The theorem indicates that if Z is fixed, then the domains of (q, t) become
one-dimensional in the region D\Z; they can be written as t(δ) and q1(δ),
where t : [−b2, b1]→ R+, q1 : [−b2, b1]→ [0, 1], and q2 = 1− q1. As done in
[32], define u1 : [−b2, b1]→ R, u1(δ) := δq1(δ) − t(δ), and define
g(u1(δ), δ) :=
∫
z:z1−z2=δ,
u1(δ)+z2>0
f(z) dz.
The function g(u1(δ), δ) resembles the marginal of f along the z1 − z2
axis, but for the fact that the marginal is computed by integrating only up
to the point where u1(z1 − z2) + z2 = 0. Call this point z∗2(δ), and observe
that u(δ + z∗2(δ), z
∗
2(δ)) = u1(δ) + z
∗
2(δ) = 0. So z2 = z
∗
2(δ) is the boundary
point between the exclusion region Z, and the other regions. Further, {z :
z1− z2 = δ, z2 < z∗2(δ)} belongs to Z. So the function g(u1(δ), δ) is actually
the marginal of f in D\Z, along the z1 − z2 axis.
Consider the problem of maximizing the expected revenue subject to IC
and IR constraints. The IC constraint, from [28, Lem. 2], can equivalently
be written as (i) q1 increasing, and (ii) u1(δ) has the representation u1(δ) =
u1(−b2) +
∫ δ
−b2 q1(δ˜) dδ˜ for every δ ∈ [−b2, b1]. The optimal mechanism can
thus be computed by solving the following optimization problem.
max
q1(·),u1(·)
∫ b1
−b2
(δq1(δ) − u1(δ))g(u1(δ), δ) dδ (13)
subject to (a) q1(δ) ∈ [0, 1]∀δ ∈ [−b2, b1]; q1 increasing;
(b)u1(δ) = u1(−b2) +
∫ δ
−b2
q1(δ˜) dδ˜ ∀δ ∈ [−b2, b1].
The IR constraint is already taken into account because the integral in
the objective function of (13) is over D\Z, i.e., where u(z) ≥ 0.
Observe that the problem (13) is similar to the optimization problem in
[28, Lem. 3]. To solve the problem in a similar way, we now search for an
equivalent of the virtual valuation function φ in our setting.
Applying integration by parts to the objective function of (13), we get∫ b1
−b2 V¯ (δ)q1(δ) dδ, where the marginal profit function V¯ : [−b2, b1] → R is
defined as5
V¯ (δ) := δg(u1(δ), δ)−
∫ b1
δ
g(u1(δ˜), δ˜) dδ˜+
∫ b1
δ
(δ˜q1(δ˜)−u1(δ˜)) ∂
∂u1
g(u1(δ˜), δ˜) dδ˜.
Notice that in Myerson’s setting, we have g(u1(δ), δ) = f(δ), and thus
V¯ (δ) = δf(δ) − ∫ b1δ f(δ˜) dδ˜ = φ(δ)f(δ). We thus expect V¯ to have simi-
lar properties of φ. The following result from [30] provides some “ironing
conditions” on V¯ , similar to those on φ in Myerson’s setting.
5We use the term marginal profit function, see Pavlov [32], based on the fact that V¯
denotes the marginal contribution of allocation q1(δ) to the profit of the seller.
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Theorem 10. [30, Lem. 3, Prop. 5] A mechanism is optimal if and only if
it satisfies the following conditions:
1. q1(δ) is strictly increasing on (δ
′, δ′′) if and only if (iff) V¯ (δ) = 0 on
this interval.
2. q1(δ) = 0 for δ ∈ [δ′, δ′′] iff (a) δ′ = −b2, (b) V¯ (δ′′) = 0 unless δ′′ = b1,
(c)
∫ δ′′
δ′ V¯ (δ) dδ = k ≤ 0, and (d)
∫ x
δ′ V¯ (δ) dδ ≥ k for all x ∈ [δ′, δ′′].
3. q1(δ) = q ∈ (0, 1) for δ ∈ [δ′, δ′′] iff (a) V¯ (δ′) = 0 unless δ′ = −b2, (b)
V¯ (δ′′) = 0 unless δ′′ = b1, (c)
∫ δ′′
δ′ V¯ (δ) dδ = 0, and (d)
∫ x
δ′ V¯ (δ) dδ ≥ 0
for all x ∈ [δ′, δ′′].
4. q1(δ) = 1 for δ ∈ [δ′, δ′′] iff (a) V¯ (δ′) = 0 unless δ′ = −b2, (b) δ′′ = b1,
(c)
∫ δ′′
δ′ V¯ (δ) dδ = k ≥ 0, and (d)
∫ δ′′
x V¯ (δ) dδ ≤ k for all x ∈ [δ′, δ′′].
δ−b2 b1
V1(δ)
A B C D E A: q1 = 0
B: q1 = q¯1 ∈ (0, 1)
C: q1 = q˜1 > q¯1
D: q1 > q˜1 increasing
E: q1 = 1
Figure 8: Illustration of the conditions in Theorem 10.
Define V1(δ) = −
∫ δ
−b2 V¯ (δ˜) dδ˜. We now argue that the conditions in
Theorem 10 can be interpreted as conditions on δ where V1 attains its global
maximum. The theorem states that the mechanism is optimal if and only
if the following conditions hold. Take δ′ and δ′′ to be the left and right end
points of an interval under consideration.
• Let q1(δ) = 0 ∀ δ ∈ [δ′, δ′′]. Then (a) δ′ = −b2 and (b) V1(δ) is
maximized at δ′′ (see region A, Figure 8).
• Let q1(δ) = q ∈ (0, 1) when δ ∈ [δ′, δ′′]. Then V1(δ) is maximized at
both δ′ and δ′′ (see regions B and C, Figure 8).
• Let q1(δ) be strictly increasing when δ ∈ [δ′, δ′′]. Then V1(δ) =
maxδ V1(δ) for all δ ∈ [δ′, δ′′] (see region D, Figure 8).
• Let q1(δ) = 1 ∀ δ ∈ [δ′, δ′′]. Then (a) δ′′ = b1 and (b) V1(δ) is maxi-
mized at δ′ (see region E, Figure 8).
Observe that the conditions mentioned above are a consequence of the
conditions stated in Theorem 10. The conditions 2(c)–(d), 3(c)–(d), and
4(c)–(d), are representations that indicate that the global maximum must
occur at certain end points of the interval. The value of q1 changes only
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at those δ where V1 attains its global maximum. We have a similar re-
sult in one-dimension, where the value of q changes only at those z where
− ∫ z0 φ(t)f(t) dt = z(1 − F (z)) is maximized [29, p. 338].
Theorem 10 and the above interpretation highlight the similarity between
the virtual valuation functions φ and V¯ . The key difference between φ and V¯
is that the former depends only on f , whereas the latter depends on u1(δ)
in addition, which is known only when the optimal mechanism is known.
So the computation of V¯ requires the knowledge of the mechanism itself.
However, given a mechanism, we can use the theorem to determine if the
mechanism is optimal or not.
We now simplify the computation of the marginal profit function. We
define virtual valuation function V : [−b2, b1]→ R as V (δ) := µ¯({z : z1−z2 ≥
δ}\Z) where µ¯ is as defined in Section 2. We then have µ¯(D) = 0 (see (3)).
The following lemma shows that V is equal to the marginal profit function
V¯ .
Lemma 11. Let the allocation function q be such that there exists a u :
D → R with ∇u = q. Then, the functions V and V¯ are one and the same.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
This lemma could be understood as follows.
• Recall that the expected revenue equals ∫ b1−b2 V¯ (δ)q1(δ) dδ. The ex-
pected revenue thus increases by V¯ (δ) for a differential increase in q1
at δ.
• A differential increase in q1 increases u uniformly for all δ′ ≥ δ, since
q = ∇u.
• From (4), we know that the expected revenue equals ∫D u dµ¯. So a
uniform increase for all δ′ ≥ δ increases the expected revenue by µ¯({z :
z1 − z2 ≥ δ}\Z).
• Thus we have V¯ (δ) = µ¯({z : z1 − z2 ≥ δ}\Z).
Observe that the virtual valuation function V can be computed if the
exclusion region Z is known. In the rest of the paper, we propose some
structures for all possible values of (c, b1, b2) ≥ 0, and then prove that the
optimal mechanisms indeed have those structures, using Theorem 10.
3.1. Optimal mechanisms for the uniform distribution on a rectangle
Without loss of generality, we assume b1 ≥ b2. The following theorem as-
serts that the optimal mechanism falls within one of the structures depicted
in Figures 2a–2g.
Theorem 12. Consider z ∼ Unif [c, c+ b1]× [c, c+ b2]. The optimal mech-
anism in the unit-demand setting is described as follows.
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1. Case b1 ∈ [b2, 3b2/2]:
(a) c ∈ [0, b2]: Figure 2a
(b)∗ c ∈ [b2, α1]: Figure 2b
(c)∗ c ∈ [α1, α2]: Figure 2c
(d)∗ c ∈ [α2, 27b
2
1b
2
2
4(b31−b32)
]: Figure
2d
(e) c ≥ 27b21b22
4(b31−b32)
: Figure 2e
2. Case b1 ≥ 3b2/2:
(a) c ∈ [0, b2]: Figure 2a
(b)∗ c ∈ [b2, β]: Figure 2b
(c) c ∈ [β, 216b21b2
108b21−108b1b2−5b22
]:
Figure 2f
(d) c ≥ 216b21b2
108b21−108b1b2−5b22
: Fig-
ure 2g
The values of α1, α2 and β are defined as follows.
• c = α1 is obtained by solving the following equations simultaneously
for (c, h, δ∗).
3h2/2 + ch+ 2b2δ
∗ − b1b2 + b22/2 = 0. (14)
27(c+ h+ δ∗)(b2 + δ∗)2 − 4(4b2 + 3δ∗)(3(h + δ∗)/2 + c)2 = 0. (15)
2b31/27 − (c+ h)h2/2 + b2(δ∗)2 − b2δ∗(b1 − b2/2) = 0. (16)
• c = α2 is the solution obtained by solving (15) and the following equa-
tions simultaneously for (c, h, δ∗).
(2b31/27 + b2(δ
∗)2 − b2δ∗(b1 − b2/2))(3h/2 + c)2
− (c+ h)(2b2δ∗ + b22/2− b1b2)2/2 = 0. (17)
2b1b2(b
2
2 + 4b2δ
∗ − 2c(δ∗ + h)− 3h(2δ∗ + h))
− (b22 + 4b2δ∗ − 3δ∗h)(b22 + 4b2δ∗ − 2cδ∗ − 3δ∗h) = 0. (18)
• c = β ≥ b2 solves
72b21b2+144b1b
2
2−90b32+(−36b21+84b1b2+399b22)c−(96b1+208b2)c2 = 0.
(19)
Remark 1. The starred portions in the theorem statement indicate that
we used Mathematica to verify certain inequalities in proving those parts.
Remark 2. The values of α1 fall in the interval [b2, tb2], where t = 3(37 +
3
√
465)/176 ≈ 1.733379. Similarly, the values of α2 ∈ [kb2, tb2] where k ≥ 1
is the root of 32k3 − 54k2 + 19 = 0 (k ≈ 1.37214), and the values of β ∈
[tb2, 2b2). See Figure 1.
The following is a pictorial representation of the results in Theorem 12.
It depicts the regions in (c, b1, b2) space at which each of the mechanisms
depicted in Figures 2a–2g turns out to be optimal.
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Figure 9: When (c, b1, b2) falls in the shaded region in the left, the optimal mechanism is
as depicted in the right. Item 1 is offered for a price of c+ δ1, and item 2 is offered for a
price of c+ δ2.
b1
b2
c
b2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
b1 = (1.5)b2
asymptotic
to b1 = b2
asymptotic
to c = 2b2
c = b2
c
c
c+
b 1
c+
b 2
c+
b 2
/3
c+
δ 2
c+
δ 1
h
c+
δ
∗
c+ b2 + δ
∗c+ 2b2/3
(0, 0)
(1, 0)
(0, 1)
(1
− a
2
, a
2
)
Figure 10: When (c, b1, b2) falls in the shaded region in the left, the optimal mechanism is
as depicted in the right. Item 1 is offered for a price of c+ δ1, item 2 is offered for a price
of c+ b2/3, and a lottery with probabilities (1− a2, a2) is offered for a price of c+ a2δ2.
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Figure 11: When (c, b1, b2) falls in the shaded region in the left, the optimal mechanism
is as depicted in the right. Item 1 is offered for a price of c+ b1/3, item 2 is offered for a
price of c+ b2/3, a lottery with probabilities (1− a2, a2) is offered for a price of c+ a2δ2,
and a lottery with probabilities (a1, 1− a1) is offered for a price of c+ a1δ1.
Remark 3. The mechanisms depicted below in Figures 12 and 13 differ
only in that the line separating the regions with allocations (1 − a, a) and
(1, 0) falls to the right of the line z1− z2 = b1− b2 in the former, and to the
left of it in the latter. These two structures meet at b1 = 3b2/2 when the
line of separation exactly falls at z1 − z2 = b1 − b2.
b1
b2
c
b2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
b1 = (1.5)b2
asymptotic
to b1 = b2
asymptotic
to c = 2b2
c = b2
c
c
c+
b 1
c+
b 2
c+
b 2
/3
c+
δ 2
c+
δ 1
c+
b 1
/3
c
+
2b
1
/3
c+ 2b2/3
(0, 0)
(1, 0)
(0, 1)
(1− a, a)
Figure 12: When (c, b1, b2) falls in the shaded region in the left, the optimal mechanism
is as depicted in the right. Item 1 is offered for a price of c+ b1/3, item 2 is offered for a
price of c+ b2/3, and a lottery with probabilities (1− a, a) is offered for a price of c+ aδ2.
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Figure 13: When (c, b1, b2) falls in the shaded region in the left, the optimal mechanism
is as depicted in the right. Item 1 is offered for a price of c+ b1/2− b2/4, item 2 is offered
for a price of c + b2/3, and a lottery with probabilities (1 − a, a) is offered for a price of
c+ aδ2.
Remark 4. Observe that the mechanisms depicted in Figures 10, 11, 12,
and 13 meet at b1 = 3b2/2, c = tb2. They meet because at this (c, b1, b2), the
parameter h (in Figures 10 and 11) becomes 0, and δ∗ = δ1 = b1/2− b2/4 =
b1/3 = b1 − b2.
Remark 5. The mechanisms depicted below in Figures 14 and 15 differ
only in that the line separating the regions with allocations (0, 1) and (1, 0)
falls to the right of the line z1 − z2 = b1 − b2 in the former, and to the left
of it in the latter. These two structures meet at b1 = 3b2/2 when the line of
separation exactly falls at z1 − z2 = b1 − b2.
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Figure 14: When (c, b1, b2) falls in the shaded region in the left, the optimal mechanism
is as depicted in the right. Item 1 is offered for a price of c + b1/3, and item 2 is offered
for a price of c.
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Figure 15: When (c, b1, b2) falls in the shaded region in the left, the optimal mechanism
is as depicted in the right. Item 1 is offered for a price of c + b1/2 − b2/4, and item 2 is
offered for a price of c.
Remark 6. The mechanisms depicted in Figures 12, 13, 14, and 15 meet
at b1 = 3b2/2, c = (243/38)b2 . They meet because at this (c, b1, b2), the
parameter a (in Figures 12 and 13) becomes 0, and b1/2 − b2/4 = b1/3 =
b1 − b2.
Remark 7. The mechanisms in Figures 14 and 15 show an interesting re-
sult – the existence of an optimal multi-dimensional mechanism without an
exclusion region. An intuitive explanation for the absence of exclusion re-
gion in Figure 15 is as follows. Consider the case where the seller offers each
allocation with a small increase in price, say ǫ. The seller then loses a rev-
enue of c from the valuations {z : u(z) ≤ ǫ}, and gains an extra revenue of
ǫ from the valuations {z : u(z) ≥ ǫ}. The mechanism will have no exclusion
region when the loss dominates the gain. Observe that the expected loss in
revenue is
c · Pr({z : u(z) ≤ ǫ}) = c
b1b2
(ǫ(b1/2− b2/4 + ǫ)) + (b1/2− b2/4)
b1b2
ǫ2
2
≈ c
b1b2
(ǫ(b1/2− b2/4)),
and that the expected gain in revenue is
ǫ · Pr({u(z) ≥ ǫ}) = ǫ · (1− Pr({u(z) ≤ ǫ})) ≈ ǫ.
The loss dominates the gain when c ≥ 4b1b22b1−b2 . (The actual threshold will
depend on more precise calculations than our order estimates.) Observe
that both the loss and the gain are of the order of ǫ, which explains the
possibility of the loss dominating the gain at very high values of c. Figure
14 has no exclusion region due to a similar reason.
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Remark 8. The notations δ1, δ2, and δ
∗, used in various mechanism depic-
tions, can be understood as follows. (i) The first transition from q = (0, 0)
on the bottom boundary of D occurs at δ = δ1. (ii) Similarly, the first tran-
sition on the left boundary of D occurs at δ = −δ2. (iii) The final transition
of q on the top/right boundary of D (in mechanisms depicted in Figures
9–11) occurs at δ = δ∗.
For a summarizing phase diagram see Figure 1. To see a portrayal of all
possible structures that an optimal mechanism can take, see Figures 2a–2g.
We now proceed to prove Theorem 12. We consider every structure
separately, and go through the following steps in order to prove that the
optimal mechanism has the specific structure.
Step 1: We compute the virtual valuation function V (δ) for every δ ∈ [−b2, b1].
Step 2: We find the relation between the variables of interest, (δ1, δ2, δ
∗, h,
a1, a2), using the equality conditions in Theorem 10.
Step 3: We prove that the solution that satisfies the relations obtained in Step
2 are indeed meaningful, by evaluating bounds for the variables of
interest.
Step 4: We verify that all the inequality conditions of Theorem 10 hold. The
bounds evaluated in Step 3 are crucially used in this process of verifi-
cation.
We now proceed to prove parts 1(a) and 2(a) of Theorem 12.
Theorem 13. Let c ∈ [0, b2]. Then the optimal mechanism is as depicted
in Figure 2a (see also Figure 9). The values of δ1 and δ2 are computed by
solving the following equations simultaneously.
− 3δ1δ2 − c(δ1 + δ2) + b1b2 = 0. (20)
− 3
2
δ22 + 2b2δ2 −
b22
2
+ (c− 2b2 + 3δ2)δ1 = 0. (21)
Proof. Step 1: We compute the virtual valuation function for the mecha-
nism depicted in Figure 9. Since µ¯(D) = 0, we compute V using the formula
V (δ) = −µ¯({z : z1 − z2 < δ} ∪ Z). (22)
V (δ) =
1
b1b2


µ¯(Z) + 32δ
2 + 2b2δ +
b22
2 δ ∈ [−b2,−δ2]
V (−δ2)− (c− 2b2 + 3δ2)(δ + δ2) δ ∈ [−δ2, δ∗]
V (δ∗)− (c− 2b2)(δ − δ∗) + 32((δ1 − δ)2 − δ22) δ ∈ [δ∗, b′]
V (b′)− (c− 2b1 + 3δ1)(δ − b1 + b2) δ ∈ [b′, δ1]
−32δ2 + 2b1δ −
b21
2 δ ∈ [δ1, b1]
(23)
27
where b1 − b2 is denoted as b′. For ease of notation, we drop the factor 1b1b2
in the rest of the paper.
Step 2: The mechanism has three unknowns: δ∗, δ1, and δ2. Observe
that the line between the points (c + b2 + δ
∗, c + b2) and (c + δ∗, c) passes
through (c+ δ1, c+ δ2). So we have δ
∗ = δ1 − δ2.
We now proceed to compute δ1 and δ2. We do so by equating µ¯(Z) = 0
and V (δ∗) = 0. The latter follows from Theorem 10 because q1 = 0 for
δ ∈ [−b2, δ∗]. We thus obtain equations (20) and (21).
Step 3: We now show that there exists a meaningful solution (δ1, δ2)
that simultaneously solves (20) and (21). Specifically, we show that there
exists a (δ1, δ2) ∈ [ b12 − b26 , 2b1−c3 ] × [ b23 , 2b2−c3 ] as a simultaneous solution to
(20) and (21). To show this, we do the following.
• We first define δ1|δ2=x to be the value of δ1 that satisfies (20) when
δ2 = x and δ2|δ1=x to be the value of δ2 that satisfies (20) when δ1 = x.
We then show that there exists a (δ1, δ2) ∈ [ b12 − b26 , 2b1−c3 ]× [ b23 , 2b2−c3 ]
satisfying (20). We do this by showing that (a) δ1|δ2=x is continuous in
x, (b) δ1|δ2= b23 ≥
b1
2 − b26 , and (c) δ1|δ2= 2b2−c3 ≤
2b1−c
3 . We further show
that in addition to continuity, δ1|δ2=x is also monotone; it decreases as
x increases.
• It now suffices to show that the entry and the exit points of the curve
(δ1|δ2=x, x) in the rectangle [ b12 − b26 , 2b1−c3 ] × [ b23 , 2b2−c3 ] changes sign
when substituted on the left-hand side of (21). The possible entry
points are ( b12 − b26 , δ2|δ1= b12 − b26 ) and (δ1|δ2= 2b2−c3 ,
2b2−c
3 ); we substitute
the entry points on left-hand side of (21) and show that the expression
is nonnegative in both cases. Similarly, the possible exit points are
(δ1|δ2= b23 ,
b2
3 ) and (
2b1−c
3 , δ2|δ1= 2b1−c3 ); we substitute the exit points on
left-hand side of (21) and show that the expression is nonpositive in
both cases.
We now fill in the details. We have δ1|δ2 = b1b2−cδ23δ2+c and δ2|δ1 = b1b2−cδ13δ1+c from
(20). It is clear that δ1|δ2=x is continuous, and also monotonically decreases
in x. We now verify that δ1|δ2= b23 ≥
b1
2 − b26 ; indeed,
b1b2 − cb2/3
c+ b2
≥ b1b2 − cb2/3
2b2
≥ b1b2 − b
2
2/3
2b2
=
b1
2
− b2
6
,
where both the inequalities hold because c ≤ b2. We now verify that
δ1|δ2= 2b2−c3 ≤
2b1−c
3 :
b1b2 − c(2b2 − c)/3
2b2
≤ 4b1b2/3− 2b2c/3
2b2
=
2b1 − c
3
,
where the inequality c2 ≤ b1b2 holds because of c ≤ b2 ≤ b1.
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We now consider the points (δ1|δ2= 2b2−c3 ,
2b2−c
3 ) and (δ1|δ2= b23 ,
b2
3 ). Sub-
stituting δ1 =
b1b2−cδ2
c+3δ2
in (21), we obtain
−9
2
δ32+ δ
2
2(6b2−
9
2
c)+ δ2(4b2c− c2− 3
2
b22+3b1b2)−
1
2
b22c+ b1b2c−2b1b22 = 0.
(24)
When δ2 =
2b2−c
3 , the left-hand side of (24) equals
1
3b2(b
2
2 − c2) ≥ 0, and
when δ2 =
b2
3 , it equals −b2(b1 − c/3)(b2 − c) ≤ 0.
We now consider the points (2b1−c3 , δ2|δ1= 2b1−c3 ) and (
b1
2 − b26 , δ2|δ1= b12 − b26 ).
Substituting δ2 =
b1b2−cδ1
3δ1+c
in (21), we obtain
− 3
2
b21b
2
2 + 2b1b
2
2c−
1
2
b22c
2 + (6b1b
2
2 + 6b1b2c− 3b22c− 4b2c2 + c3)δ1
+ (9b1b2 − 9
2
b22 − 18b2c+
3
2
c2)δ21 − 18b2δ31 = 0. (25)
When δ1 =
2b1−c
3 , the left-hand side of (25) equals
1
6 (−8b31b2+3b21b22+4b21c2+
2b1b2c
2−c4). We claim that this expression is negative for b1 ≥ b2, c ∈ [0, b2].
Observe that its derivative with respect to c satisfies 4c(b1(2b2+b2)−c2) ≥ 0
for all c ∈ [0, b2], and thus the expression attains its maximum when c = b2.
At c = b2, the expression equals b2(b1 − b2)(−8b21 − b1b2 + b22) which clearly
is nonpositive when b1 ≥ b2. We have proved our claim.
Now when δ1 =
b1
2 − b26 , the left-hand side of (25) equals
1
24
(b2 − c)(27b21b2 − 18b1b22 − b32 + (42b1b2 − 9b21 − b22)c+ 4(b2 − 3b1)c2)
=
1
24
(b2 − c)(A0 +A1c+A2c2).
Observe that we have a quadratic expression in c, with A2 being negative.
So to prove that this quadratic expression is nonnegative for c ∈ [0, b2], it
suffices to prove that it is nonnegative at c = 0 and c = b2. At c = 0, the
expression equals 27b21b2 − 18b1b22 − b32 ≥ 0 for b1 ≥ b2, and at c = b2, it
equals 18b21b2 + 12b1b
2
2 + 2b
3
2 ≥ 0.
We have thus shown that there exists a solution (δ1 δ2) ∈ [ b12 − b26 , 2b1−c3 ]×
[ b23 ,
2b2−c
3 ] that simultaneously solves (20) and (21), for every c ∈ [0, b2] and
b1 ≥ b2.
Step 4: We now proceed to prove parts (c) and (d) in Theorem 10(2)
and 10(4). Observe that the proof is complete if we prove that V (δ) ≤ 0
when δ ∈ [−b2, δ∗], and V (δ) ≥ 0 when δ ∈ [δ∗, b1]. We now compute V ′(δ)
29
for almost every δ ∈ [−b2, b1].
V ′(δ) =


3δ + 2b2 δ ∈ (−b2,−δ2)
−(c− 2b2 + 3δ2) δ ∈ (−δ2, δ∗]
−(c− 2b2)− 3(δ1 − δ) δ ∈ [δ∗, b1 − b2)
−(c− 2b1 + 3δ1) δ ∈ (b1 − b2, δ1)
−3δ + 2b1 δ ∈ (δ1, b1).
(26)
Observe that V ′(δ) is negative when δ ∈ [−b2,−2b23 ], and positive when
δ ∈ [−2b23 , δ∗] (follows because δ2 ≤ 2b2−c3 ). We also have V (−b2) = V (δ∗) =
0. So V (δ) = V (−b2) +
∫ δ
−b2 V
′(δ˜) dδ˜ ≤ 0 for all δ ∈ [−b2, δ∗], and hence∫ δ∗
−b2 V (δ) dδ ≤ 0, and
∫ x
−b2 V (δ) dδ ≥
∫ δ∗
−b2 V (δ) dδ for all x ∈ [−b2, δ∗].
We now claim that V ′(δ) is positive when δ ∈ [δ∗, 2b13 ], and negative
when δ ∈ [2b13 , b1]. Observe that V ′(δ) is continuous at δ = δ∗, and that it
increases in the interval [δ∗, b1 − b2]. So V ′(δ) ≥ 0 when δ ∈ [δ∗, b1 − b2].
Also, V ′(δ) ≥ 0 when δ ∈ [b1 − b2, δ1] because δ1 ≤ 2b1−c3 . That V ′(δ) is
positive when δ ∈ [δ1, 2b13 ], and negative when δ ∈ [2b13 , b1] is obvious. We
have proved our claim.
Since we also have V (δ∗) = V (b1) = 0, it follows that V (δ) = V (δ∗) +∫ δ
δ∗ V
′(δ˜) dδ˜ ≥ 0 for all δ ∈ [δ∗, b1]. So we have
∫ b1
δ∗ V (δ) dδ ≥ 0 and∫ b1
x V (δ) dδ ≤
∫ b1
δ∗ V (δ) dδ for all x ∈ [δ∗, b1]. 
With the above theorem, we have completely solved the c ≤ b2 case.
We now analyze the case at which the transition occurs. At c = b2, when
we solve (20) and (21) simultaneously, we obtain δ2 =
b2
3 =
2b2−c
3 and
δ1 =
b1
2 − b26 . When c > b2, the left-hand side of (24) still continues to change
sign at δ2 =
b2
3 and δ2 =
2b2−c
3 , but since
b2
3 >
2b2−c
3 , the solution δ2 now
belongs to the interval [2b2−c3 ,
b2
3 ]. We thus have (i) V (− b23 ) = 0 = V (δ∗),
and (ii) V ′(δ) ≥ 0 when δ ∈ [−2b23 ,−δ2] and V ′(δ) ≤ 0 when δ ∈ [−δ2, δ∗].
These both imply that V (δ) ≥ 0 when δ ∈ [− b23 , δ∗]. So the minimum of∫ x
−b2 V (δ) dδ can never occur at x = δ
∗, causing the condition in part (d) of
Theorem 10(2) to fail.
At c = b2, a transition occurs from the structure depicted in Figure 2a to
that in Figure 2b. We now proceed to prove the optimality of the structure
in 2b, i.e., parts 1(b) and 2(b) in Theorem 12.
Theorem 14. Let c ∈ [b2, β] if b1 ≥ 3b2/2 and let c ∈ [b2, α1] if b1 ∈
[b2, 3b2/2] with α1 and β as defined in Theorem 12. Then, the optimal
mechanism is as depicted in Figure 2b (see also Figure 10). The values of h
and δ∗ are obtained by solving (14) and (15) simultaneously, and the values
of (δ1, δ2) are given by
(δ1, δ2) =
(
h+ δ∗,
b1b2 − (3h/2 + c)(h + δ∗)
3/2(h + δ∗) + c
)
.
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The probability of allocation a2 is given by a2 =
h+δ∗
δ2+δ∗
.
Proof. Step 1: We compute the virtual valuation function for the mech-
anism depicted in Figure 10.
V (δ) =
{
V (−δ2)− (c− 2b2 + 3δ2)(δ + δ2) + 32 δ2−hδ2+δ∗ (δ + δ2)2 δ ∈ [−δ2, δ∗]
V (δ∗)− (c− 2b2)(δ − δ∗) + 32 ((δ1 − δ)2 − h2) δ ∈ [δ∗, b′]
where b1−b2 is denoted by b′. The expression for V (δ) when δ ∈ [−b2,−δ2]∪
[b1 − b2, b1] remains the same as in (23).
Step 2: The mechanism has five parameters: h, δ∗, δ1, δ2, and a2.
Observe that the 45◦ line segment joining the points (c+ b2+ δ∗, c+ b2) and
(c + δ∗, c) passes through (c + δ1, c + h). So we have δ1 = h + δ∗. Since
q = ∇u, a conservative field, we must have the slope of the line separating
(0, 0) and (1−a2, a2) allocation regions satisfying −1−a2a2 = h−δ2h+δ∗ . This yields
a2 =
h+δ∗
δ2+δ∗
.
We now proceed to compute h, δ2 and δ
∗. We do so by equating µ¯(Z) =
0, V (δ∗) = 0, and
∫ δ∗
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ = 0. The latter two conditions follow from
Theorem 10 3(b) and 3(c) because q1(δ) = 1− a2 ∈ (0, 1) for δ ∈ [− b23 , δ∗].
We then have the following implications.
µ¯(Z) = 0⇒ −3
2
(h+ δ∗)(h+ δ2)− c(δ2 + h+ δ∗) + b1b2 = 0. (27)
From (22), we see that V (δ∗) is the negative of µ¯ measure of the nonconvex
pentagon bound by (c, c), (c, c+ b2), (c+ b2+ δ
∗, c+ b2), (c+ δ1, c+ h), and
(c+ δ1, c). Thus
V (δ∗) = 0⇒ −3
2
h2 − ch− 3
2
b2(b2 + 2δ
∗) + b2(b2 + δ∗) + b1b2 = 0 (28)
⇒ h = −c+
√
c2 + 3b2(2b1 − b2 − 4δ∗)
3
. (29)
Next,∫ δ∗
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ = 0⇒
∫ −δ2
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ +
∫ δ∗
−δ2
V (δ) dδ = 0
⇒ b2(δ22 − b22/9) +
1
2
(b32/27 − δ32) + b22/2(b2/3 − δ2)
− (2b2δ2 − 3δ22/2 − b22/2)(δ∗ + δ2)− (c− 2b2 + 2δ2 + h)(δ∗ + δ2)2/2 = 0
⇒ 1
54
(4b2 + 3δ
∗)(b2 + 3δ∗)2 − (c+ h+ δ
∗)
2
(δ∗ + δ2)2 = 0. (30)
The values of h, δ∗, and δ2 can be obtained by solving (27), (29), and
(30) simultaneously. We now proceed to prove that (h, δ∗) can be obtained
by solving (14) and (15) simultaneously. From (28), we get
3h2/2 + ch+ 2b2δ
∗ − b1b2 + b22/2 = 0 (31)
31
which is (14). We next find an expression for δ2 + δ
∗. Rearranging (27), we
get
δ2 =
b1b2 − (3h/2 + c)(h + δ∗)
3/2(h + δ∗) + c
=
2b2δ
∗ + b22/2− δ∗(3h/2 + c)
3/2(h + δ∗) + c
(32)
where we have used (31). Thus
δ2 + δ
∗ =
(b2 + 3δ
∗)(b2 + δ∗)/2
3/2(h + δ∗) + c
.
Plugging this into (30), we eliminate δ2, and obtain
27(c+ h+ δ∗)(b2 + δ∗)2 − 4(4b2 + 3δ∗)(3(h + δ∗)/2 + c)2 = 0 (33)
which is (15). It is thus clear that (h, δ∗) can be obtained by simultaneously
solving (14) and (15).
Step 3: We now prove that a meaningful solution that satisfies (31) and
(33) exists, by evaluating the bounds of the variables h, δ∗, and δ2 . In Step
3a, we prove the bounds on (h, δ∗) when b1 ≥ 3b2/2. In Step 3b, we prove
the bounds on (h, δ∗) when b1 ∈ [b2, 3b2/2]. In Step 3c, we prove the bounds
on δ2 for all b1.
Step 3a: Consider the case when b1 ≥ 3b2/2. We consider a pair
of (δ∗, h) values that satisfy (31) as the end points, and prove that the
expression on the left-hand side of (33) changes sign at those end points.
Given that h is a decreasing function of δ∗ (see (29)), this suffices to show
the bounds of (δ∗, h).
We claim that when c ∈ [0, β], there exists a (δ∗, h) ∈ [ c2+6b1b2−7b2212b2 ,
b1
2 −
b2
4 ]× [0, 2b2−c3 ] that solves (31) and (33) simultaneously. Observe that h is a
decreasing function of δ∗ (see (29)), and that the pairs (δ∗, h) = ( b12 − b24 , 0)
and (δ∗, h) = ( c
2+6b1b2−7b22
12b2
, 2b2−c3 ) satisfy (31). The choice h =
2b2−c
3 will be
motivated later. It suffices now to indicate that it is to satisfy condition 3(d)
of Theorem 10. We now prove that the left-hand side of (33) has opposite
signs at these pairs of (δ∗, h). Substituting (δ∗, h) = ( c
2+6b1b2−7b22
12b2
, 2b2−c3 ),
we obtain
−(c− b2)(6b1b
2
2 + b
3
2 + 6b1b2c+ 9b
2
2c+ b2c
2 + c3)
4b2
≤ 0 (34)
for every c ≥ b2. Substituting (δ∗, h) = ( b12 − b24 , 0), we obtain
1
16
(72b21b2 + 144b1b
2
2 − 90b32 + (−36b21 + 84b1b2 + 399b22)c− (96b1 + 208b2)c2)
which is nonnegative for every c ∈ [0, β]. So by continuity of (33), there
exists a (δ∗, h) in the rectangle [ c
2+6b1b2−7b22
12b2
, b12 − b24 ]× [0, 2b2−c3 ], and by the
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continuity of (31), the pair (δ∗, h) also satisfies (31). We have thus proved
our claim.
Step 3b: Consider the case when b1 ∈ [b2, 3b2/2]. We claim that
there exists a (δ∗, h) ∈ [ c2+6b1b2−7b2212b2 , b1 − b2] × [
−c+
√
c2+3b2(3b2−2b1)
3 ,
2b2−c
3 ]
simultaneously solving (31) and (33). As before, substitution of (δ∗, h) =
(
c2+6b1b2−7b22
12b2
, 2b2−c3 ) yields (34). We now substitute the other pair of (δ
∗, h)
on the left-hand side of (33), and obtain
9b21
(
3b1 − 3b2 + 2c+
√
9b22 − 6b1b2 + c2
)
− (3b1 + b2)
(
3b1 − 3b2 + c+
√
9b22 − 6b1b2 + c2
)2
. (35)
We now show that this expression is nonnegative for every b1 ∈ [b2, 3b2/2],
c ∈ [b2, α1]. We do so by the following steps: (a) We first differentiate the
expression with respect to c and show that the differential is nonpositive;
(b) We then evaluate the expression at c = 2(t−1)(b1− b2)+ b2 (recall from
Remark 2 that t = 3(37+3
√
465)/176) and show that it is nonnegative; and
(c) We finally show that α1 ≤ 2(t− 1)(b1 − b2) + b2.
We now differentiate the expression w.r.t. c. Fix v =
√
9b22 − 6b1b2 + c2.
When b1 ∈ [b2, 3b2/2] and c ≥ b2, we have
(i) v =
√
9b22 − 6b1b2 + c2 ≥
√
9b22 − 6(3b2/2)b2 + c2 = c,
(ii) v =
√
9b22 − 6b1b2 + c2 ≤
√
9b22 − 6(b2)b2 + c2 =
√
3b22 + c
2 ≤ 2c.
So we have c ≤ v ≤ 2c. Differentiating (35) with respect to c, we have
18b21 +
9b21c
v
− 2(3b1 + b2)(−3b2 + 3b1 + c+ v)(1 + c/v)
=
18b21v + 9b
2
1c− 2(3b1 + b2)(c+ v)2 − (18b21 + 2(−6b1b2 − 3b22)(c+ v))
v
=
−9b21c+ 2(c+ v)(3b2(2b1 + b2)− (3b1 + b2)(c+ v))
v
=
−9b21c+ 2(c+ v)((2b1 + b2)(2b2 − c− v) + b2(2b1 + b2)− b1(c+ v))
v
≤ −9b
2
1c+ 2(c+ v)b
2
2
v
≤ −9b
2
1c+ 6cb
2
2
v
≤ 0
where the first inequality follows from c+v ≥ 2c ≥ 2b2, the second inequality
from c+ v ≤ 3c, and the third inequality from b2 ≤ b1.
We now proceed to evaluate the expression at c = 2(t− 1)(b1 − b2) + b2.
33
Substituting c = 2(t− 1)(b1 − b2) + b2 in (35), we now verify if
15(117
√
465 − 4189)b31 + 13(13417 − 225
√
465)b21b2
1936
− (70269 − 981
√
465)b1b
2
2 + 9(5021 − 21
√
465)b32
1936
+
(
−(201 + 27√465)b21 + (134 + 18
√
465)b1b2 + (111 + 9
√
465)b22
44
)
√√√√9b22 − 6b1b2 +
(
2
(
3(37 + 3
√
465)
176
− 1
)
(b1 − b2) + b2
)2
≥ 0
Writing the above expression as X + Y
√
Z, we note that (i) X ≤ 0 when
b1 ∈ b2[1, 1.03873], and X ≥ 0 when b1 ∈ b2[1.03873, 1.5]; (ii) Y ≥ 0 when
b1 ∈ b2[1, 1.04088], and Y ≤ 0 when b1 ∈ b2[1.04088, 1.5]. So we now verify
if X2 − Y 2Z ≤ 0 when b1 ∈ b2[1, 1.03873], and if X2 − Y 2Z ≥ 0 when
b1 ∈ b2[1.04088, 1.5]. That X + Y
√
Z ≥ 0 when b1 ∈ b2[1.03873, 1.04088] is
clear since bothX and Y are positive in that interval. Evaluating X2−Y 2Z,
we have
9
42592
(b1 − b2)(3b2 − 2b1)((20196
√
465 − 447876)b42
+ (108900
√
465− 2234628)b1b32 + (32337
√
465 − 952857)b21b22
+ (4841141 − 276237
√
465)b31b2 + (140940
√
465− 1820460)b41)
which is negative when b1 ∈ b2[1, 1.03977] and positive when b1 ∈ b2[1.03977, 1.5].
We have thus shown that the expression in (19) is nonnegative when b1 ∈
[b2, 3b2/2], b2 ≤ c ≤ 2(t− 1)(b1 − b2) + b2. That α1 ≤ 2(t− 1)(b1 − b2) + b2
is shown via Mathematica (see Appendix D.1(4)).
Step 3c: For both the cases, we now claim that δ2 ∈ [2b2−c3 , b23 ]. To
prove the claim, we do the following.
• We show the upper bound δ2 ≤ b23 via Mathematica (see Appendix D.1(2)).
• We next show the lower bound. Since δ2 = (b1b2 − (3h/2 + c)(h +
δ∗))/(3(h + δ∗)/2 + c) decreases with (h+ δ∗), we first find the upper
bound on (h+ δ∗).
• We then substitute this obtained upper bound on (h+δ∗) and simplify,
resulting in the lower bound δ2 ≥ 2b2−c3 .
We now fill in the details. To find the upper bound on δ1 = h + δ
∗,
we first show that δ1, as a function of δ
∗, decreases with increase in δ∗.
Differentiating the expression for δ1 = (h + δ
∗) with h as in (29), we get
1− 2b2√
c2+3b2(2b1−b2−4δ∗)
which is nonpositive for δ∗ ≥ (c2+6b1b2−7b22)/(12b2).
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But this is exactly the lower bound that we computed for δ∗. The highest
value of δ1 thus occurs at (h, δ
∗) = (2b2−c3 ,
c2+6b1b2−7b22
12b2
). Using these expres-
sions, we get δ1 = (h+ δ
∗) ≤ c2+6b1b2+b22−4b2c12b2 .
We now substitute the end points of h+ δ∗ in (32), to evaluate the lower
bound of δ2.
δ2 =
b1b2 − (3h/2 + c)(h+ δ∗)
3(h+ δ∗)/2 + c
≥ b1b2 − (b2 + c/2)(c
2 + 6b1b2 + b
2
2 − 4b2c)/(12b2)
(c2 + 6b1b2 + b22 + 4b2c)/(8b2)
=
2b2 − c
3
+
4b2(c
2 − b22)
3(c2 + 6b1b2 + b
2
2 + 4b2c)
≥ 2b2 − c
3
where the first inequality occurs from the upper bound h ≤ (2b2 − c)/3
and the above upper bound on (h + δ∗), and the second inequality from
c ≥ b2. We have thus shown the lower bound. We have also shown that the
probability of allocation a2 =
h+δ∗
δ2+δ∗
≤ 1, since δ2 ≥ 2b2−c3 ≥ h.
Step 4: We now proceed to prove parts (c) and (d) of Theorem 10 (2)–
(4). The expression for V ′(δ) is the same as in the proof of Theorem 13,
except in [−δ2, δ∗], where it is given by
V ′(δ) = −(c− 2b2 + 3δ2) + 3 δ2 − h
δ2 + δ∗
(δ + δ2),∀δ ∈ (−δ2, δ∗]. (36)
From (26), observe that V ′(δ) is negative when δ ∈ [−b2,−2b23 ] and positive
when δ ∈ [−2b23 ,− b23 ]. We also have from (23) that V (−b2) = V (− b23 ) = 0.
So V (δ) = V (−b2) +
∫ δ
−b2 V
′(δ˜) dδ˜ ≤ 0 for all δ ∈ [−b2,− b23 ]. It follows
that
∫ − b2
3
−b2 V (δ) dδ ≤ 0, and that
∫ x
−b2 V (δ) dδ ≥
∫ − b2
3
−b2 V (δ) dδ for all x ∈
[−b2,− b23 ]. Thus condition (2) of Theorem 10 is verified.
We now prove that
∫ x
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ ≥ 0 for every x ∈ [ b23 , δ∗]. Observe
that V ′(δ) is positive when δ ∈ [− b23 ,−δ2], negative when δ ∈ [−δ2, l2] for
some l2 ∈ [−δ2, δ∗], and positive when δ ∈ [l2, δ∗]. These statements follow
from (i) δ2 ≥ 2b2−c3 , (ii) V ′(δ) increasing in the interval [−δ2, δ∗], and (iii)
h ≤ 2b2−c3 , all of which can be obtained from (36). We also have V (− b23 ) =
V (δ∗) =
∫ δ∗
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ = 0, which we used to derive the parameters h, δ2,
and δ∗. It follows that
∫ x
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ ≥ 0 for all x ∈ [− b23 , δ∗]. Thus condition
(3) of Theorem 10 is verified.
The proof that the conditions of Theorem 10 (4) are satisfied trace the
same steps as in the proof of Theorem 13, provided δ1 ≤ 2b1−c3 . If δ1 > 2b1−c3 ,
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then V ′(δ) is no more positive in the interval [b1 − b2, δ1]. We consider two
cases.
Let b1 ≥ 3b2/2. Then we claim that V (δ) ≥ 0 holds for all δ ∈ [δ∗, b1],
even when V ′(δ) ≤ 0 for δ ∈ [b1 − b2, δ1]. Observe that (i) V (δ) = 12 (3δ −
b1)(b1 − δ) ≥ 0 for all δ ∈ [max(b1 − b2, b13 ), b1], and (ii) δ1 ≥ b1 − b2 ≥ b13 ,
when b1 ≥ 3b2/2. So, V (δ) ≥ 0 for all δ ∈ [b1 − b2, b1]. Now V (δ) ≥ 0 also
holds in the interval δ ∈ [δ∗, b1− b2] since V ′(δ) ≥ 0 in that interval (see the
discussion following (26)), and since V (δ∗) = 0. We have proved our claim.
We now consider the case when b1 ∈ [b2, 3b2/2]. V (δ) could possibly be
negative at some values of δ. We now evaluate
∫ b1
3
δ∗ V (δ) dδ:
∫ b1
3
δ∗
V (δ) dδ
=
∫ b1−b2
δ∗
V (δ) dδ +
∫ δ1
b1−b2
V (δ) dδ +
∫ b1
3
δ1
V (δ) dδ
= − 2
27
b31 − b2(δ∗)2 + b2δ∗(b1 − b2/2) + b1b2h−
b22h
2
− 2b2hδ∗ − ch
2
2
− h3
= − 2
27
b31 +
(c+ h)
2
h2 − b2(δ∗)2 + b2δ∗(b1 − b2/2) + hV (δ∗)
where V (δ∗) is obtained from (28). The last expression is the same as (16),
since V (δ∗) = 0. From Mathematica, (16) is nonnegative for all c ∈ [b2, α1]
(see Appendix D.1(3)). Since
∫ b1
b1
3
V (δ) dδ = 227b
3
1 ≥ 0, we have
∫ b1
δ∗ V (δ) dδ ≥
0. This verifies condition 4(c) of Theorem 10.
Observe that V ′(δ) ≤ 0 only when δ ∈ [b1 − b2, δ1]. Also, V (δ∗) =
0 = V ( b13 ). So V (δ) can be negative only when δ is in some subset of
[b1− b2, b13 ], say in the interval [l1, b13 ]. Observe that the integral
∫ b1
x V (δ) dδ
thus attains its maximum either at δ∗ or at b13 . But we just evaluated∫ b1
3
δ∗ V (δ) dδ ≥ 0, and so the maximum cannot be at x = b13 . Thus we have∫ b1
x V (δ) dδ ≤
∫ b1
δ∗ V (δ) dδ for all x ∈ [δ∗, b1]. Hence the result. 
Observe that at c = α1, we have
∫ b1
3
δ∗ V (δ) dδ = 0. When c > α1, the
quantity turns negative, causing the condition in Theorem 10(4d) to fail. A
transition occurs from the structure depicted in Figure 2b to that depicted
in Figure 2c. We now proceed to prove the optimality of the structure in
Figure 2c, i.e., part 1(c) of Theorem 12.
Theorem 15. Consider the case when b1 ∈ [b2, 3b2/2], and c ∈ [α1, α2],
where α1 and α2 are as defined as in Theorem 12. Then the optimal mech-
anism is as depicted in Figure 2c (see also Figure 11). The values of h and
δ∗ are found by solving (15) and (17) simultaneously, and the values of δ1
36
and δ2 are given by
(δ1, δ2) =
(
δ∗ +
b1b2 − 2b2δ∗ − b22/2
3h/2 + c
,
b1b2 − (3h/2 + c)δ1
3/2(h + δ∗) + c
)
.
The values of a1 and a2 are given by (a1, a2) =
(
h
δ1−δ∗ ,
h+δ∗
δ2+δ∗
)
.
Proof. See Appendix B. This too relies on Mathematica for verification of
certain inequalities. 
Consider b1 ∈ [b2, 3b2/2]. The proof (in Appendix B) indicates that at
c = α2, we have a1 + a2 = 1, and that when c > α2, we have a1 + a2 < 1.
This causes the monotonicity of q1 to fail (recall that q1 increasing is one
of the constraints of Problem (13)). Further, when a1 + a2 = 1, the slope
of the line segment joining (c, c + δ2), (c + h + δ
∗, c + h), and the slope
of the line segment joining (c + h + δ∗, c + h), (c + δ1, c), are equal, i.e.,
−1−a2a2 = −
a1
1−a1 . The two line segments thus turn into a single line segment
that joins (c, c+ δ2), (c+ δ1, c). A transition thus occurs from the structure
depicted in Figure 2c to that in Figure 2d, with a2 = 1− a1 = a.
Consider b1 ≥ 3b2/2. At c = β, we have h = 0. Thus a transition occurs
from the structure depicted in Figure 2b to that in Figure 2f.
We now proceed to prove the optimality of the structures depicted in
Figures 2d–2g, i.e., parts 1(d)–(e) and 2(c)–2(d) of Theorem 12.
Theorem 16. (i) Consider the case when c ∈ [β, 216b21b2
108b21−108b1b2−5b22
], and
b1 ≥ 3b2/2, where β is as defined Theorem 12. Then the optimal mech-
anism is as depicted in Figure 2f (see also Figure 13). The values of δ1
and δ2 are computed by solving the following equations simultaneously.
− 3
2
δ1δ2 − c(δ1 + δ2) + b1b2 = 0.
− 2
27
b32 +
1
2
δ1δ2(δ2 − δ1) + c
2
(δ22 − δ21) +
1
16
b2(2b1 − b2)2 = 0.
The value of a is given by a = δ1δ1+δ2 . If c ≥
216b21b2
108b21−108b1b2−5b22
, then the
optimal mechanism is as depicted in Figure 2g (see also Figure 15).
(ii) Consider the case when b1 ∈ [b2, 3b2/2], and c ∈ [α2, 27b
2
1b
2
2
4(b31−b32)
], where
c = α2 is as defined in Theorem 12. Then the optimal mechanism is
as depicted in Figure 2d (see also Figure 12). The values of δ1 and δ2
are computed by solving the following equations simultaneously.
− 3
2
δ1δ2 − c(δ1 + δ2) + b1b2 = 0.
2
27
(b31 − b32) +
1
2
δ1δ2(δ2 − δ1) + c
2
(δ22 − δ21) = 0.
37
The value of a is given by a = δ1δ1+δ2 . If c ≥
27b21b
2
2
4(b31−b32)
, then the optimal
mechanism is as depicted in Figure 2e (see also Figure 14).
Proof. See Appendix B. 
4. On Extending to Uniform Distributions on General Rectangles
We have computed the optimal mechanism in the two-item unit-demand
setting when z ∼ Unif[c, c+ b1]× [c, c + b2] for every nonnegative (c, b1, b2).
Our computation used the method based on the virtual valuation function
designed in [32]. We can now ask if there is a generalization of this method
for more general distributions, specifically for uniform distributions on rect-
angles [c1, c1 + b1] × [c2, c2 + b2], when c1 6= c2. We conjecture that the
optimal mechanisms would have structures similar to the five structures as
in the case of c1 = c2. We now report some promising preliminary results
that support this conjecture.
Theorem 17. Consider the case when b1 ≥ b2. Let c2 ≥ 0, c1 ≥ c2, and
2c1 − c2 ≤ b2. Then, the optimal mechanism is as depicted in Figure 2a
(see also Figure 9). The values of δ1 and δ2 are computed by solving the
following equations simultaneously.
− 3δ1δ2 − c2δ1 − c1δ2 + b1b2 = 0.
− 3
2
δ22 + 2b2δ2 −
b22
2
− d(b2 − δ2) + (c2 − 2b2 + 3δ2)δ1 = 0.
Proof. See Appendix B. The proof traces the same steps as in the proof
of Theorem 13. 
5. Conclusion and Future Work
We solved the problem of computing the optimal mechanism for the
two-item one-buyer unit-demand setting, when the buyer’s valuation z ∼
Unif[c, c+ b1]× [c, c+ b2] for arbitrary nonnegative values of (c, b1, b2). Our
results show that a wide range of structures arise out of different values of
c. When the buyer guarantees that his valuations for the items are at least
c, the seller offers different menus based on the guaranteed minimum c and
the upper bounds c+ bi, i = 1, 2.
Taking a cue from the solution method in the unrestricted setting [35],
we initially attempted to solve the problem using the duality approach in
[18], but constructing a dual measure in the unit-demand setting turned
out to be intricate. We then used the virtual valuation method used in [32]
to compute the solution. We now characterize the pros and cons of these
approaches.
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The duality approach could not be pursued systematically because the
construction of a shuffling measure that both convex-dominates 0 and spans
over more than one line segment appears to be difficult. Observe that in
both Examples 2 and 3, there exists some constant allocation region that is
a part of both the top boundary and the right boundary of D. So the shuf-
fling measure had to be constructed so that it spans over two line segments
connected at the top-right corner of D. To get around this issue, we had to
construct (i) a shuffling measure on the line z1 + z2 = 2c + δ2 in Example
2, and (ii) a shuffling measure that transfers mass horizontally in Example
3. The problem of constructing a “generalized” shuffling measure that both
convex-dominates 0 and also spans over two segments, thereby rendering
the dual approach practical, is a possible direction for future work.
The virtual valuation method on the other hand, did not pose any is-
sue when constant allocation regions span over the top-right corner. The
approach provides a generalized procedure to verify if a menu at hand is
optimal or not, under the (only) constraint that the distribution satisfies
the negative power rate condition (stated in Theorem 8). So unlike the du-
ality approach, we cannot use this approach to solve the problem for general
distributions. But our results for z ∼ Unif[c, c + b1] × [c, c + b2] and the
extension to general rectangles suggest that this approach can be used to
solve the problem of computing the optimal mechanism for all distributions
satisfying the negative power rate condition. The key challenge in solving
these problems is to find the exclusion region Z for arbitrary distributions,
so that we can use Theorem 10 to verify if the menu is optimal or not. Com-
ing up with a generalized procedure to compute Z is a possible direction for
future work.
Our proofs used Mathematica to verify certain algebraic inequalities that
turn out to be complicated functions of (c, b1, b2) involving fifth roots and
eighth roots of some expressions. This leads us to the following questions.
From a rather abstract perspective, Pavlov’s sufficient conditions lead to the
identification of a family of polynomial equalities and inequalities in the vari-
ables (h, δ∗, δ1, δ2) in Figures 9–15, indexed by the parameters (c, b1, b2). In a
nutshell, our work is a careful analysis of the solution space, denoted Lc,b1,b2 ,
associated with the polynomial equalities and inequalities. We argued that
Lc,b1,b2 is nonempty for every parameter (c, b1, b2). We also captured the
transitions of Lc,b1,b2 as the parameters vary. Can this view provide a more
systematic procedure to solve the case of uniform distribution on any rectan-
gle in the positive quadrant, or more generally, the case of any distribution
of valuations on the positive quadrant? Alternatively, can the procedure of
this paper (both existence of solutions and capture of transitions) be auto-
mated on Mathematica or other similar tool? These are some computation
related problems that might be of interest to the computer scientists.
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Appendix
Appendix A. Proofs from Section 2
Proof of Lemma 5: We first compute the quantities α¯(1)([1.26, 1.26 +
2/3] × {2.26}) and ∫ 2/30 t dα¯(1)(1.26 + t, 2.26):
α¯(1)([1.26, 1.26 + 2/3] × {2.26}) =
∫ 2/3
0
(3t− 1) dt = (3/2)(2/3)2 − 2/3 = 0,
∫ 2/3
0
t dα¯(1)(1.26 + t, 2.26) =
∫ 2/3
0
t(3t− 1) dt = 2
3
33
− 1
2
· 2
2
32
≥ 0.
We compute the same quantities for β(1):
β¯(1)([1.26 + 2/3, 2.26] × {2.26})
=
∫ 43/63
2/3
(3t− 1) dt +
∫ 1
43/63
(t(1.0155) + (1.9845)(43/63) − 2.26) dt
= (3/2)((43/63)2 − (2/3)2)− 1/63 + 1.0155(1 − (43/63)2)/2
+ (20/63)(1.9845(43/63) − 2.26) = 0,
and∫ 1
2/3
t dβ¯(1)(1.26 + t, 2.26)
=
∫ 43/63
2/3
t(3t− 1) dt+
∫ 1
43/63
t(t(1.0155) + (1.9845)(43/63) − 2.26) dt
= (43/63)3 − (2/3)3 − ((43/63)2 − (2/3)2)/2 + (1.0155)(1 − (43/63)3)/3
+ (1− (43/63)2)(1.9845(43/63) − 2.26)/2 = 0.
Now consider h to be the affine shift of any increasing convex function
g (i.e., h = θ1g + θ2, θ1 > 0, θ2 ∈ R) such that h(t) = t for t = 43/63
and t = 2.26−1.9845∗43/631.0155 ≈ 0.891679. Observe that β(1)(1.26 + t, 2.26) ≥ 0
when t ∈ [2/3, 43/63] ∪ [0.891679, 1], and β(1)(1.26 + t, 2.26) < 0 when t ∈
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(43/63, 0.891679). So we have h(t) ≤ t when β(1) < 0, and h(t) ≥ t when
β(1) > 0. Now,∫ 1
2/3
g(t) dβ¯(1)(1.26 + t, 2.26)
=
1
θ1
∫ 1
2/3
h(t) dβ¯(1)(1.26 + t, 2.26)
=
1
θ1
(∫ 1
2/3
(h(t)− t+ t) dβ¯(1)(1.26 + t, 2.26)
)
=
1
θ1
(∫ 1
2/3
(h(t)− t) dβ¯(1)(1.26 + t, 2.26)
)
≥ 0
where the first equality follows from β¯(1)([1.26 + 2/3, 2.26] × {2.26}) = 0,
the third equality follows from
∫ 1
2/3 t dβ¯
(1)(1.26 + t, 2.26) = 0, and the last
inequality follows because sgn (h(t) − t) = sgn (β(1)(t)) for every t ∈ [2/3, 1].
The proof of β¯(1) cvx 0 is similar. Hence the result. 
Proof of Theorem 6: We define q as given in Figure 3b, and construct
u such that ∇u = q. We now construct the shuffling measure λ¯+∑i(α¯(i) +
β¯(i)) as follows. We define α(i) and β(i) same as in (7) and (8) respectively,
but with δ1 = δ2 =
((3+
√
33)/8)−1
(27−3√33)/32 > δ
′
2 and a = (27 − 3
√
33)/32. We define
λ : D → R, as in (9).
We now construct γ as follows. Let γ1 = γ
Z
1 + γ
D\Z
1 , with γ
Z
1 = µ¯
Z
and γ
D\Z
1 = (µ¯
D\Z +
∑
i(α¯
(i) + β¯(i)))+ + λ¯+. This is supported on Z ∪
([1.5, 2.5] × {2.5}) ∪ ({2.5} × [1.5, 2.5]) ∪ {z : λ(z) ≥ 0}. We define γs1 as
the Radon-Nikodym derivative of γ1 w.r.t. the surface Lebesgue measure.
It is easy to see that γs1(z) = µs(z) +
∑
i(α
(i)(z) + β(i)(z)) + λ(z) when
z ∈ (Z ∩D)([1.5, 2.5]×{2.5})∪ ({2.5}× [1.5, 2.5])∪{z : λ(z) ≥ 0}, and zero
otherwise. Now we specify γ(· | x) for every x in the support of γ1.
(a) For x ∈ Z, we define γ(y | x) = δx(y). This is interpreted as no mass
being transferred.
(b) For x ∈ ([1.5, 2.5] × {2.5}) ∪ ({2.5} × [1.5, 2.5]), we define γ(y | x) =
(µ(y) + µs(y) + λ(y))−/γs1(x) when y ∈ {y ∈ QRSδ2P2P1δ1Q : y1 −
y2 = x1 − x2}, and zero otherwise (see Figure A.16). (By an abuse of
notation, we denote the values of δ1 and δ2 as points marked in the
Figure.) This is interpreted as transfer of γs1(x) from the boundary to
the above line segment.
(c) For {x : λ(x) > 0}, we define γ(y | x) = (µ(y) + µs(y))−/λ(x) when
y ∈ {y ∈ (δ1P1δ′1δ1)∪(δ2P2δ′2δ2) : y1−y2 = x1−x2}, and zero otherwise
(see Figure A.16). This is interpreted as transfer of λ(x) from the point
x on the line x1 + x2 = 2c+ δ2 to the above line segment.
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Figure A.16: The mechanism in Figure 3b magnified near its left-bottom corner. The full
support set D is denoted by PQRS. The slope of the dotted lines equal −(1− a)/a and
−a/(1 − a), respectively, with a = (27 − 3√33)/32. P1, P2 are points where the dotted
lines intersect with the line denoted δ′1δ
′
2.
We then define γ(F ) =
∫
(x,y)∈F γ1(dx)γ(dy | x) for any measurable F ∈
D × D. It is now easy to check that γZ2 = µ¯Z , and γD\Z2 = (µ¯D\Z +∑
i(α¯
(i) + β¯(i)))− + λ¯−. Thus we have (γ1 − γ2)Z = 0, and (γ1 − γ2)D\Z =
µ¯D\Z +
∑
i(α¯
(i) + β¯(i)) + λ¯.
The proof that γ satisfies all the required conditions of Lemma 3 traces
the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 4. The extra step here is to show
that λ¯ cvx 0. We do this (i) by proving that both the measure λ¯ and its
mean vanish in its support set, and then (ii) by using the same arguments
in Lemma 5. We now compute∫ 1
1−δ2
λ(c+ (t− 1 + δ2)/2, c + δ2 − (t− 1 + δ2)/2) dt
=
∫ δ2−√5/3+1
0
(3at+ c) dt
+
∫ 1
1−(
√
5/3−1)
(3t(a− 1/2) + 3/2(1 − (
√
5/3 − 1))− 3a(1 − δ2)) dt
= 3/2(δ2 −
√
5/3 + 1)2 + c(δ2 −
√
5/3 + 1)
+ 3/2(a − 1/2)(1 − (2−
√
5/3)2)
+ (
√
5/3− 1)(3/2(2 −
√
5/3)− 3a(1 − δ2))
= 0
where the last equality follows by putting in the values of c and δ2. We also
have∫ 1
1−δ2
(t− 1)λ(c + (t− 1 + δ2)/2, c + δ2 − (t− 1 + δ2)/2) dt
+
∫ 1
1−δ1
(t− 1)λ(c + δ1 + (t− 1 + δ1)/2, c − (t− 1 + δ1)/2) dt = 0
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which follows because (i) λ is symmetric about the line t = 1, and (ii) (t−1)
is an odd function about the line t = 1. The proof of λ¯ cvx 0 now traces
the same steps as in Lemma 5. 
Proof of Theorem 7: We define q as given in Figure 6, and construct
u such that ∇u = q. Defining δ∗ := δ1 − δ2, we now construct the shuffling
measure α¯ + α¯(o) + α¯(h), according to the terms defined in (10), (11), and
(12).
We now construct γ as follows. Let γ1 = γ
Z
1 + γ
D\Z
1 , with γ
Z
1 = µ¯
Z
and γ
D\Z
1 = (µ¯
D\Z + α¯+ α¯(o) + α¯(h))+. This is supported on Z ∪ ([0, 1.2] ×
{1}) ∪ ({1.2} × [0, 1]). We define γs1 as the Radon-Nikodym derivative of
γ1 w.r.t. the surface Lebesgue measure. It is easy to see that γ
s
1(z) =
µs(z)+α(z)+α
(o)(z)+α(h)(z) when z ∈ (Z∩D)([0, 1.2]×{1})∪({1.2}×[0, 1]),
and zero otherwise. Now we specify γ(· | x) for every x in the support of γ1.
(a) For x ∈ Z, we define γ(y | x) = δx(y). This is interpreted as no mass
being transferred.
(b) For x ∈ ([0, 1 + δ∗]×{1})∪ ({1.2} × ([0, δ1 − 0.2]∪ [2/3, 1])), we define
γ(y | x) = (µ(y) + µs(y))−/γs1(x) when y ∈ {y ∈ D\Z : y1 − y2 =
x1 − x2}, and zero otherwise. This is interpreted as transfer of γs1(x)
from the boundary to the above line segment.
(c) For x ∈ ([1+δ∗, 1.2]×{1}), we define γ(y | x) = (µ(y)+µs(y))−/γs1(x)
when {y1 − y2 = x1 − x2, y2 ∈ [2/3, 1]}, and zero otherwise. Again,
this is interpreted as transfer of γs1(x) from the boundary to the above
line segment.
(d) For x ∈ ({1.2}×[δ1−0.2, 2/3]), we define γ(y | x) = (µ(y)+µs(y))−/γs1(x),
when y ∈ {y ∈ D\Z : y1 − y2 = x1 − x2} ∪ {y2 = x2, y1 − y2 ∈
[δ∗, b1 − b2]}, and zero otherwise. This is interpreted as a transfer
of γs1(x) from the boundary to two line segments – one is a 45
◦ line
segment contained within D\Z, and the other is a horizontal line con-
tained within {y1−y2 ∈ [δ∗, b1−b2]}. The transfers occur respectively
due to the shuffling measures α(o), oblique transfer, and α(h), horizon-
tal transfer.
We then define γ(F ) =
∫
(x,y)∈F γ1(dx)γ(dy | x) for any measurable F ∈
D × D. It is now easy to check that γZ2 = µ¯Z , and γD\Z2 = (µ¯D\Z +
α¯ + α¯(o) + α¯(h))−. Thus we have (γ1 − γ2)Z = 0, and (γ1 − γ2)D\Z =
(µ¯D\Z + α¯+ α¯(o) + α¯(h)).
The proof that γ satisfies all the required conditions of Lemma 3 traces
the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 4. The extra step here is to show
that α¯ cvx 0, α¯(o) + α¯(h) cvx 0. We show α¯ cvx 0 by first proving that
α¯([0, 1+δ∗]×{1}) = 0 ≤ ∫ 1+δ∗0 t α¯(dt, 1), and then by tracing the same steps
as in the proof of Lemma 5. The convex dominance for the other measure
is also shown the same way. We now fill in the details. To obtain α¯ cvx 0,
43
we first verify that
α¯([0, 1 + δ∗]× {1}) =
∫ 1−δ2
0
(3t− 1) dt +
∫ 1+δ∗
1−δ2
(2− 3δ2) dt
= 3/2(1 − δ2)2 − (1− δ2) + δ1(2− 3δ2)
= 0,
and then verify that∫ 1+δ∗
0
t α¯(dt, 1)
=
∫ 1−δ2
0
t(3t− 1) dt+
∫ 1+δ∗
1−δ2
t(2− 3δ2) dt
= (1− δ2)3 − (1− δ2)2/2 + (2− 3δ2)((1 + δ∗)2 − (1− δ2)2)/2
≈ 0.103227 ≥ 0.
We then complete the proof of α¯ cvx 0 by tracing the same steps as in the
proof of Lemma 5.
To prove that α¯(o) + α¯(h) cvx 0, we first verify that
(α¯(o) + α¯(h))({1.2} × [0, 1])
=
∫ 1.2−δ1
0
(3t− 1.2) dt +
∫ 1
1.2−δ1
(2.4 − 3δ1) dt
+
∫ δ2
δ1−0.2
3(t− δ1 + 0.2) dt +
∫ 2/3
δ2
3(0.2 − δ∗) dt
= 3/2(1.2 − δ1)2 − 1.2(1.2 − δ1) + (δ1 − 0.2)(2.4 − 3δ1)
+ 3/2(0.2 − δ∗)2 + (2− 3δ2)(0.2 − δ∗)
= 0,
and then verify that∫ 1
0
t (α¯(o) + α¯(h))(1.2, dt)
=
∫ 1.2−δ1
0
t(3t− 1.2) dt +
∫ 1
1.2−δ1
t(2.4 − 3δ1) dt
+
∫ δ2
δ1−0.2
3t(t− δ1 + 0.2) dt +
∫ 2/3
δ2
3t(0.2 − δ∗) dt
= (1.2 − δ1)3 − 0.6(1.2 − δ1)2 + (1.2 − 3δ1/2)(1 − (1.2 − δ1)2)
+ (δ32 − (δ1 − 0.2)3)− 3/2(δ1 − 0.2)(δ22 − (δ1 − 0.2)2)
+ 3/2(4/9 − δ22)(0.2 − δ1 + δ2) ≈ 0.137171 ≥ 0.
The proof of α¯(o) + α¯(h) cvx 0 is then completed by tracing the same steps
of the proof of Lemma 5. 
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Appendix B. Proofs from Section 3 and Section 4
Proof of Lemma 11: Recall that the marginal profit function is defined
as V¯ (δ) = δg(u1(δ), δ)−
∫ b1
δ g(u1(δ˜), δ˜) dδ˜+
∫ b1
δ (δ˜q1(δ˜)−u1(δ˜)) ∂∂u1 g(u1(δ˜), δ˜) dδ˜.
Consider the term
∫ b1
δ g(u1(δ˜), δ˜) dδ˜.∫ b1
δ
g(u1(δ˜), δ˜) dδ˜ =
∫ b1
δ
∫
z:z∈D\Z,z1−z2=δ˜
f(z) dz dδ˜
=
∫
z:z∈D\Z,z1−z2≥δ
f(z) dz.
We use integration by parts on
∫
X(z.∇h(z) − h(z))f(z) dz, and we obtain∫
X h(z)ν(z) dz +
∫
∂X h(z)νs(z) dz. Here,
ν(z) := −z · ∇f(z)− 3f(z), z ∈ X; νs(z) := (z · n(z))f(z), z ∈ ∂X.
We regard ν as the density of a measure that is absolutely continuous with
two-dimensional Lebesgue measure, and νs as the density of a measure that
is absolutely continuous with the surface Lebesgue measure. Defining the
measure ν¯(A) :=
∫
X 1A(z)ν(z) dz+
∫
∂X 1A(z)νs(z) dz for all measurable sets
A and substituting h(z) = 1∀z ∈ X, we get ∫X(z.∇h(z) − h(z))f(z) dz =∫
X −f(z) dz = ν¯(X). So we have∫ b1
δ
g(u1(δ˜), δ˜) dδ˜ =
∫
z:z∈D\Z,z1−z2≥δ
f(z) dz = −ν¯(z ∈ D\Z : z1 − z2 ≥ δ).
We now compare the components of the measures µ¯ and ν¯ in some set
X ⊆ D. The functions µ and ν are clearly equal. The function νs(z) is
nonzero in every z ∈ ∂X, whereas µs(z) is nonzero only when z ∈ (X ∩∂D).
In other words, νs(z) is also nonzero for every z ∈ (∂X\∂D), when compared
with µs(z). We now show that the terms δg(u1(δ), δ) and
∫ b1
δ (δ˜q1(δ˜) −
u1(δ˜))
∂
∂u1
g(u1(δ˜), δ˜) dδ˜ cancel those “extra” nonzero values. In other words,
we show that
δg(u1(δ), δ) +
∫ b1
δ
(δ˜q1(δ˜)− u1(δ˜)) ∂
∂u1
g(u1(δ˜), δ˜) dδ˜
= (µ¯ − ν¯)(z : z ∈ D\Z, z1 − z2 ≥ δ), (B.1)
and this completes our proof. We show this for the mechanism depicted
below in Figure B.17, with the exclusion region Z being a convex, decreasing
set. Observe that all the mechanisms depicted in Figures 2a–2g have this
property.
Define z∗2 : [−δ2, δ1]→ [c, c+ δ2] as
z∗2(δ) = {z2 ∈ [c, c+ b2] : u(z2 + δ, z2) = 0,
u(z2 + δ + h, z2 + h) > 0 for all h > 0 sufficiently small}.
45
ca
se
1
δ(1)
−δ2
−b2
ca
se
3
δ(3)
ca
se
2
δ(2)
x
b1 − b2 δ1 b1
Z
Figure B.17: The structure of a typical mechanism. The variables marked in the boundary
denote the values of δ.
Observe that z∗2(δ) is the value of z2 in the curve (−δ2δ1) that separates Z
and D\Z, when z1 − z2 = δ. So z∗2 is decreasing with δ, with z∗2(−δ2) =
c + δ2, and z
∗
2(δ1) = c. Also, the curve (−δ2δ1) can be represented by
the points {(δ + z∗2(δ), z∗2 (δ)), δ ∈ [−δ2, δ1]}. We now compute u1(δ) for
every δ ∈ [−b2, b1]. We use the fact that u(z) = 0 when z ∈ Z, and
u(z) = u1(z1 − z2) + z2.
u1(δ) =


−c− δ2 −
∫ −δ2
δ q1(δ˜) dδ˜ if δ ∈ [−b2,−δ2]
−z∗2(δ) if δ ∈ [−δ2, δ1]
−c+ ∫ δδ1 q1(δ˜) dδ˜ if δ ∈ [δ1, b1].
Using the values of u1(δ), we now compute g(u1(δ), δ).
g(u1(δ), δ) =
1
b1b2


b2 + δ if δ ∈ [−b2,−δ2]
b2 + c+ u1(δ) if δ ∈ [−δ2, b1 − b2]
b1 − δ + c+ u1(δ) if δ ∈ [b1 − b2, δ1]
b1 − δ if δ ∈ [δ1, b1].
For ease of notation, we drop the factor 1/(b1b2) in the rest of the proof.
To show (B.1), we consider the following three cases: (i) δ ∈ [δ1, b1], (ii)
δ ∈ [−δ2, δ1], and (iii) δ ∈ [−b2,−δ2] (see Figure B.17). In case (i), consider
δ = δ(1). The measures µ¯ and ν¯ differ only in that ν¯ has an extra nonzero
line measure on the line segment {z ∈ D\Z : z1 − z2 = δ(1)}. We thus have
(µ¯− ν¯)(z ∈ D\Z : z1 − z2 ≥ δ(1)) = −
∫
z∈D\Z:
z1−z2=δ(1)
νs(z) dz
=
∫
z∈D\Z:
z1−z2=δ(1)
(z1 − z2)f(z) dz = δ(1)g(u1(δ(1)), δ(1)).
Now observe that ∂∂u1 g(u1(δ), δ) = 0 when δ ∈ [δ1, b1]. So (B.1) holds.
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In case (ii), consider δ = δ(2). Then, ν¯ has an extra nonzero line measure
on (i) the line segment {z ∈ D\Z : z1 − z2 = δ(2)}, and (ii) the curve δ1x.
Now we have
(µ¯− ν¯)(z ∈ D\Z : z1 − z2 ≥ δ(2))
= −
∫
z∈D\Z:
z1−z2=δ(2)
νs(z) dz −
∫
z∈curve δ1x
νs(z) dz
=
∫
z∈D\Z:
z1−z2=δ(2)
(z1 − z2)f(z) dz −
∫
z∈curve δ1x
(z · n(z))f(z) dz
= δ(2)g(u1(δ
(2)), δ(2)) +
∫ δ1
δ(2)
((z∗2(δ) + δ)q1(δ) + z
∗
2(δ)(1 − q1(δ))) dδ
= δ(2)g(u1(δ
(2)), δ(2)) +
∫ δ1
δ(2)
(z∗2(δ) + δq1(δ)) dδ.
where the third equality follows because (i) ∇u = q, and (ii) q1(δ)+q2(δ) = 1
for z ∈ D\Z. Now observe that we have ∂∂u1 g(u1(δ), δ) = 1 when δ ∈
[−δ2, δ1]. Therefore,
δ(2)g(u1(δ
(2)), δ(2)) +
∫ b1
δ(2)
(δq1(δ)− u1(δ)) ∂
∂u1
g(u1(δ), δ) dδ
= δ(2)g(u1(δ
(2)), δ(2)) +
∫ δ1
δ(2)
(z∗2(δ) + δq1(δ)) dδ.
Eq. (B.1) thus holds for case 2.
In case (iii), consider δ = δ(3). Then, ν¯ has an extra nonzero line measure
on (i) the line segment {z ∈ D\Z : z1−z2 = δ(3)}, and (ii) the curve (−δ2δ1).
Now by an analysis similar to case 2, it follows that
(µ¯− ν¯)(z ∈ D\Z : z1 − z2 ≥ δ(3))
= δ(3)g(u1(δ
(3)), δ(3)) +
∫ δ1
−δ2
(z∗2(δ) + δq1(δ)) dδ
= δ(3)g(u1(δ
(3)), δ(3)) +
∫ b1
δ(3)
(δq1(δ) − u1(δ)) ∂
∂u1
g(u1(δ), δ) dδ.

Proof of Theorem 15:
Step 1: We compute the virtual valuation function of the mechanism
depicted in Figure 11.
V (δ) =
{
V (−δ2)− (c− 2b2 + 3δ2)(δ + δ2) + 32 δ2−hδ2+δ∗ (δ + δ2)2 δ ∈ [−δ2, δ∗]
V (δ∗)− (c− 2b2)(δ − δ∗) + 3h2 (δ1−δ)
2
δ1−δ∗ − 3h2 (δ1 − δ∗) δ ∈ [δ∗, b′]
47
where b1−b2 is indicated as b′. The expression for V (δ) when δ ∈ [−b2,−δ2]∪
[δ1, b1] remains the same as in (23), and the expression when δ ∈ [b′, δ1] is
given by
V (δ) = V (b′)−(c−2b1)(δ−b′)− 3
2
(δ2−(b′)2− h
δ1 − δ∗ ((δ1−δ)
2−(δ1−b′)2)).
Step 2: The mechanism has six unknowns: h, δ∗, δ1, δ2, a1, and a2.
Since q = ∇u, a conservative field, we must have the slope of the line
separating (0, 0) and (1−a2, a2) allocation regions satisfying −1−a2a2 = h−δ2h+δ∗ ,
which yields a2 =
h+δ∗
δ2+δ∗
. Similarly, the slope of the line separating (0, 0) and
(a1, 1 − a1) allocation regions must satisfy − a11−a1 = hδ1−δ∗−h , which yields
a1 =
h
δ1−δ∗ .
We compute the other four unknowns by equating µ¯(Z) = 0, V (δ∗) = 0,∫ δ∗
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ = 0, and
∫ b1
3
δ∗ V (δ) dδ = 0. The latter three conditions follow
from Theorem 10 3(b) and 3(c) because q1(δ) = 1−a2 for δ ∈ [− b23 , δ∗], and
q1(δ) = a1 for δ ∈ [δ∗, b13 ]. We then have the following implications.
µ¯(Z) = 0⇒ −(3h/2 + c)(δ1 + δ2)− 3δ2δ∗/2 + b1b2 = 0. (B.2)
From (26), we see that V (δ∗) is the negative of µ¯ measure of the nonconvex
pentagon bound by (c, c), (c, c+ b2), (c+ b2+ δ
∗, c+ b2), (c+ h+ δ∗, c+ h),
and (c+ δ1, c). Thus
V (δ∗) = 0⇒ −(3h/2 + c)(δ1 − δ∗)− 2b2δ∗ − b22/2 + b1b2 = 0. (B.3)
The expression for
∫ δ∗
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ remains the same as in (31).
∫ δ∗
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ = 0⇒ 1
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(4b2 + 3δ
∗)(b2 + 3δ∗)2 − c+ h+ δ
∗
2
(δ∗ + δ2)2 = 0.
(B.4)
Next
∫ b1
3
δ∗
V (δ) dδ = 0
⇒
∫ b1−b2
δ∗
V (δ) dδ +
∫ δ1
b1−b2
V (δ) dδ +
∫ b1
3
δ1
V (δ) dδ = 0
⇒ − 2
27
b31 + b1b2δ1 +
1
2
(−b22δ1 + 2b2δ∗(−2δ1 + δ∗)− (δ1 − δ∗)2(c+ 2h)) = 0
⇒ c+ h
2
(δ1 − δ∗)2 − b2(δ∗)2 + b2δ
∗
2
(2b1 − b2)− 2
27
b31 + (δ1 − δ∗)V (δ∗) = 0.
(B.5)
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The values of h, δ∗, δ1 and δ2 can be obtained by solving these four
equations simultaneously. We now proceed to prove that (h, δ∗) can be
computed by solving (15) and (17) simultaneously.
We first find an expression for δ2 + δ
∗. Rearranging (B.2), we have
δ2 =
b1b2 − (3h/2 + c)δ1
3/2(h + δ∗) + c
(B.6)
Similarly, rearranging (B.3), we have δ1 = δ
∗+ b1b2−2b2δ
∗−b22/2
3h/2+c . Substituting
δ1 in (B.6), we get
δ2 + δ
∗ =
b1b2 − (3h/2 + c)(δ1 − δ∗) + 32(δ∗)2
3/2(h + δ∗) + c
=
(b2 + 3δ
∗)(b2 + δ∗)/2
3/2(h + δ∗) + c
.
Plugging this into (B.4), we eliminate δ2. Similarly, plugging (δ1 − δ∗) =
b1b2−2b2δ∗−b22/2
3h/2+c (obtained by rearranging (B.3)) in (B.5), we eliminate δ1. We
thus solve the following equations:
27(c + h+ δ∗)(b2 + δ∗)2 − 4(4b2 + 3δ∗)(3/2(h + δ∗) + c)2 = 0
(2b31/27 + b2(δ
∗)2 − b2δ∗(b1 − b2/2))(3h/2 + c)2
− (c+ h)
2
(2b2δ
∗ + b22/2− b1b2)2 = 0
which are (15) and (17), respectively.
Step 3: We now proceed to evaluate the bounds of the variables, in
order to the prove the existence of a meaningful solution that solves (15)
and (17). In Step 3a, we first prove that the condition q1 increasing in
Problem (13) is satisfied only when the left-hand side of (18) is nonnegative.
In Steps 3b–3d, we prove the bounds on (h, δ∗), δ1 and δ2, respectively.
Step 3a: We compute the values of c where monotonicity of q1 holds.
Observe that monotonicity of q1 holds when 1 − a2 ≤ a1, and that of q2
holds when 1− a1 ≤ a2. We thus verify if a1 + a2 ≥ 1. On substituting the
expressions for a1 and a2, we obtain
(h+ δ∗)(3/2(h + δ∗) + c)
(3/2(δ∗)2 + 2b2δ∗ + b22/2)
+
h(3h/2 + c)
(b1b2 − 2b2δ∗ − b22/2)
≥ 1
⇒ (b22 + 4b2δ∗ − 3δ∗h)(b22 + 4b2δ∗ − 2cδ∗ − 3δ∗h)
− 2b1b2(b22 + 4b2δ∗ − 2c(δ∗ + h)− 3h(2δ∗ + h)) ≥ 0.
The monotonicity condition thus amounts to verifying if the left-hand side
of (18) is nonnegative. We verify via Mathematica that the expression is
nonnegative for c ∈ [b2, α2], and that α2 ≤ 2(t − 1.4)(b1 − b2) + 1.4b2 (see
Appendix D.2(6–7)). We thus compute the bounds of h, δ∗, δ1, and δ2 when
c ∈ [b2, 2(t− 1.4)(b1 − b2) + 1.4b2].
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Step 3b: We now evaluate the bounds on δ1 and δ2 in order to prove the
existence of a meaningful solution that solves (15) and (17) simultaneously.
Specifically, we now prove that there exists (h, δ∗) ∈ [0, 2b2−c3 ] × [0, b1 − b2]
that simultaneously solves (15) and (17). We show this using the same
techniques as in Step 3 of proof of Theorem 13.
We first show that δ∗|h is continuous in h, and decreases as h increases.
We rewrite (17) as follows.
((3h/2 + c)2 − 2b2(c+ h))(b2(δ∗)2 − b2(b1 − b2/2)δ∗)
+
2b31
27
(3h/2 + c)2 − b
2
2
2
(b1 − b2/2)2(c+ h) = 0
Solving this equation for δ∗, we obtain
δ∗|h = b1
2
− b2
4
− 3b2 − 2b1
4
3h/2 + c
3
√
(8b1 − 3b2)/3
2b22(c+ h)− b2(3h/2 + c)2
To prove the continuity of δ∗|h in h, it suffices to show that the term
2b22(c + h) − b2(3h/2 + c)2 is strictly positive for the desired values of h,
since the expression is quadratic with negative coefficient on h2. At h = 0,
the expression equals b2c(2b2 − c) > 0 for all c ≤ 2b2, and at h = 2b2−c3 , the
expression equals b2/12(2b2 − c)(2b2 +3c) > 0. Thus δ∗|h is continuous in h
when h ∈ [0, 2b2−c3 ].
To prove that δ∗|h decreases in h, it suffices to prove that c+h(3h/2+c)2
decreases with h. We prove it by differentiating the term w.r.t. h, and
proving that the numerator is nonpositive. The numerator of the derivative
is (3h/2 + c)(−3h/2 − 2c) ≤ 0. We have thus shown that δ∗|h decreases as
h increases.
We now show that δ∗|
h=
2b2−c
3
≤ b1 − b2. From (17), we obtain
δ∗|
h=
2b2−c
3
=
b1
2
− b2
4
− (3b2 − 2b1)
4
(2b2 + c)
3b2
√
b2(8b1 − 3b2)
(2b2 − c)(2b2 + 3c) .
Observe that (a) 2b2+ c ≥ 3b2 since c ≥ b2, and (b) b2(8b1−3b2)(2b2−c)(2b2+3c) ≥ 1 since
minb1∈[b2,3b2/2](b2(8b1 − 3b2)) = 5b22 and maxc≥b2((2b2 − c)(2b2 + 3c)) = 5b22.
We thus have
δ∗|
h=
2b2−c
3
≤ b1
2
− b2
4
− 3b2 − 2b1
4
= b1 − b2.
We now show that δ∗|h=0 ≥ 0. From (17), we obtain
δ∗|h=0 = b1
2
− b2
4
− (3b2 − 2b1)
36
√
3c(8b1 − 3b2)
b2(2b2 − c) .
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When b1 ∈ [b2, 3b2/2], δ∗|h=0 decreases when c increases from b2 to 2b2. We
thus obtain a lower bound on δ∗ by substituting an upper bound on c. We
use c ≤ 1.4b2+2(1.75− 1.4)(b1 − b2) instead of 1.4b2 +2(t− 1.4)(b1 − b2) to
simplify the calculation.
δ∗|h=0 ≥ 2b1 − b2
4
− 3b2 − 2b1
36
√
2.1(b1 + b2)(8b1 − 3b2)
b2(1.3b2 − 0.7b1)
To prove that this expression is nonnegative, it suffices to prove that (9(2b1−
b2))
2(b2(1.3b2 − 0.7b1)) ≥ (3b2 − 2b1)2(2.1(b1 + b2)(8b1 − 3b2)). Simplifying
this expression, we obtain
−67.2b41 − 67.2b31b2 + 648b21b22 − 648b1b32 + 162b42 ≥ 0
which is true for b1 ∈ [b2, 3b2/2]. We have thus shown that δ∗|h=0 ≥ 0.
We now proceed to prove that (a) substituting the entry points (h|δ∗=0, 0)
and (2b2−c3 , δ
∗|
h=
2b2−c
3
) makes the expression nonpositive, and (b) substitut-
ing the exit points (0, δ∗|h=0) and (h|δ∗=b1−b2 , b1 − b2) on left-hand side of
(15) makes the expression nonnegative.
We now consider the entry point (h|δ∗=0, 0). Substituting δ∗ = 0 on
(17), we obtain 2b31(3h/2 + c)
2/27 − (c + h)b22(b1 − b2/2)2/2 = 0. Let h =
h|δ∗=0 solve this equation. Substituting (h, δ∗) = (h|δ∗=0, 0) in (15), we get
27(c + h|δ∗=0)b22 − 16b2(3h|δ∗=0/2 + c)2. We now prove that this expression
is nonpositive.
27(c + h|δ∗=0)b2 − 16(3h|δ∗=0/2 + c)2
= 27(c + h|δ∗=0)b2 − 108(c + h|δ
∗=0)b
2
2(b1 − b2/2)2
b31
=
27(c + h|δ∗=0)b2
b31
(b31 − 4b2(b1 − b2/2)2)
=
27(c + h|δ∗=0)b2
b31
(b1 − b2)(b21 − 3b1b2 + b22) ≤ 0
when b1 ∈ [b2, 3b2/2]. The first equality occurs since h|δ∗=0 solves 2b31(3h/2+
c)2/27 − (c+ h)b22(b1 − b2/2)2/2 = 0.
We now consider the entry point (2b2−c3 , δ
∗|
h=
2b2−c
3
). We first prove that
δ∗|
h=
2b2−c
3
≥ −2b23 .
δ∗|
h=
2b2−c
3
≥ −2b2
3
⇒ b1
2
− b2
4
− (3b2 − 2b1)
4
(2b2 + c)
3b2
√
b2(8b1 − 3b2)
(2b2 − c)(2b2 + 3c) ≥ −
2b2
3
⇒ (6b1 + 5b2)2b2(2b2 − c)(2b2 + 3c) ≥ (3b1 − 2b2)2(2b2 + c)2(8b1 − 3b2)
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Consider b2 ≤ c ≤ tb2, and b1 ∈ [b2, 3b2/2] (recall that t = 3(37+3
√
465)/176).
The inequality then clearly holds, since we have (a) 6b1+5b2 ≥ 8b1−3b2, (b)
(6b1+5b2)(2b2− c) ≥ (6b1+5b2)b2/4 ≥ b22 ≥ (3b2−2b1)2, (c) b2 ≥ 3b2−2b1,
and (d) 2b2 + 3c ≥ 2b2 + c. We have thus shown that δ∗|h= 2b2−c
3
≥ −2b23 .
Substituting (h, δ∗) = (2b2−c3 , δ
∗|
h=
2b2−c
3
) on the left-hand side of (15),
we get
(b2 − c)(2b22 + 4b2c+ 3(b2 + c)δ∗|h= 2b2−c
3
) ≤ 0
for c ≤ b2, since δ∗|h= 2b2−c
3
≥ −2b23 .
The expression is thus nonpositive at the entry points. We now proceed
to prove that the expression is nonnegative at the exit points.
We now consider the exit point (0, δ∗|h=0). Substituting h = 0 on the
left-hand side of (17), we obtain
δ∗|h=0 = b1
2
− b2
4
− (3b2 − 2b1)
36
√
3c(8b1 − 3b2)
b2(2b2 − c)
Substituting (h, δ∗) = (0, δ∗|h=0) on the left-hand side of (15), we get
27b22c− 16b2c2 + (27b22 + 6b2c− 12c2)δ∗|h=0 + 9(2b2 − c)(δ∗|h=0)2.
From Mathematica, this is nonnegative when c ∈ [b2, 2(t − 1.4)(b1 − b2) +
1.4b2] (see Appendix D.2(1)).
We now consider the exit point (h|δ∗=b1−b2 , b1 − b2). Substituting δ∗ =
b1 − b2 in (17), we obtain
h|δ∗=b1−b2 =
9b22 − 4c(b1 + 3b2) + 3b2
√
9b22 + 4c(b1 + 3b2)
6(b1 + 3b2)
.
Substituting (h, δ∗) = (h|δ∗=b1−b2 , b1 − b2) in (15), we get
27b21(b1 − b2 + c+ h|δ∗=b1−b2)− (3b1 + b2)(3b1 − 3b2 + 2c+ 3h|δ∗=b1−b2)2.
From Mathematica, this is nonnegative when c ∈ [b2, 2(t − 1.4)(b1 − b2) +
1.4b2] (Appendix D.2(2)). The expression is thus nonnegative at the exit
points.
We have thus shown that there exists a (h, δ∗) ∈ [0, 2b2−c3 ] × [0, b1 − b2]
that simultaneously solves (15) and (17), for all values of (c, b1, b2) in the
statement of the theorem.
Step 3c: We now prove that δ1 ∈ [h + δ∗, b13 ]. To prove δ1 ≥ h + δ∗,
we first assume the contrapositive, and do the following. (a) Solving (14)
and (15) simultaneously, we obtain (hII , δ
∗
II) in the mechanism depicted
in Figure 10. We prove that ((hII , δ
∗
II) < (hIII , δ
∗
III)); (b) We then show∫ b1
3
δ∗II
VII(δ) dδ ≥
∫ b1
3
δ∗III
VIII(δ) dδ = 0. But
∫ b1
3
δ∗II
VII(δ) dδ is negative for c ∈
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[α1, tb2] (from Appendix D.1(3)), which is a contradiction. We now proceed
to prove our claim.
Observe that when δ1 < h + δ
∗, we have a1 > 1, and the mechanism
appears as depicted (in solid lines) in Figures B.18a and B.18b. We now
solve the problem for the parameters (hII , δ
∗
II) in the mechanism depicted
in Figure 2b. We first prove that if (h, δ∗) satisfies (15), then h increases
with increase in δ∗. Solving (15) for h, we get
h =
9b22 − 16b2c− 6δ∗(b2 + 2c)− 9(δ∗)2
6(4b2 + 3δ∗)
+
3(b2 + δ
∗)
√
9b22 + 16b2c+ 6δ
∗(3b2 + 2c) + 9(δ∗)2
6(4b2 + 3δ∗)
.
Denoting X := 9b22+16b2c+6δ
∗(3b2+2c)+ 9(δ∗)2, and differentiating with
respect to δ∗, we get
∂h
∂δ∗
=
(4b2 + 3δ
∗)
(
−6(b2 + 2c+ 3δ∗) + 3
√
X + 3(b2+δ
∗)(9b2+6c+9δ∗)√
X
)
6(4b2 + 3δ∗)2
−
3
(
9b22 − 16b2c− 6δ∗(b2 + 2c)− 9(δ∗)2 + 3(b2 + δ∗)
√
X
)
6(4b2 + 3δ∗)2
=
−51b22 − 72b2δ∗ − 27(δ∗)2 + 3b2
√
X + 9(4b2+3δ
∗)(b2+δ∗)(3b2+2c+3δ∗)√
X
6(4b2 + 3δ∗)2
≥ 0
if (9(δ∗)2+24b2δ∗+17b22)
√
X ≤ b2 ·X+3(4b2+3δ∗)(b2+δ∗)(3b2+2c+3δ∗).
Squaring this expression on both sides and simplifying, we have
4(4b2 + 3δ
∗)2(b2 − c)(b22(9b2 + 25c) + 6b2δ∗(3b2 + 5c) + 9(δ∗)2(b2 + c)) ≤ 0
which clearly is true for c ≥ b2. This proves that if (h, δ∗) satisfies (15), then
h increases monotonically in δ∗.
We now claim that (hII , δ
∗
II) < (hIII , δ
∗
III). This is because if not,
then (i) (hII , δ
∗
II) > (hIII , δ
∗
III) must hold, since (h, δ
∗) in both the mecha-
nisms satisfies (15), and h monotonically increases in δ∗; (ii) If (hII , δ∗II) >
(hIII , δ
∗
III), then µ¯(Z) = 0 cannot be true for both the mechanisms simul-
taneously (see Figure B.18a). We have proved our claim.
We now evaluate
∫ b1
3
δ∗II
VII(δ) dδ −
∫ b1
3
δ∗III
VIII(δ) dδ. From (22), we have
V ′(δ) = −µ¯(z : z ∈ D\Z, z1 − z2 = δ}. Observe from Figure B.18b that
V ′II(δ) < V
′
III(δ) when δ ∈ (l, δII1 ) for some l ∈ [δ∗III , δIII1 ], V ′II(δ) > V ′III(δ)
when δ ∈ [δ∗II , l), and V ′II(δ) = V ′III(δ) when δ ∈ [δII1 , b13 ] ∪ {l}. Since we
have VII(δ
∗
II) = VIII(δ
∗
III) = VII(
b1
3 ) = VIII(
b1
3 ) = 0, we conclude that
VII(δ) ≥ VIII(δ) when δ ∈ [δ∗II , b13 ]. Further, from V ′(δ) = −(c − 2b2) −
53
3(δII1 −δ) = −(c−2b2+3δII2 )+3δ when δ ∈ [δ∗II , b1−b2], we have V ′II(δ) ≥ 0
in that interval, and thus VII(δ) = VII(δ
∗
II) +
∫ δ
δ∗II
V ′II(δ˜) dδ˜ ≥ 0. Therefore,
∫ b1
3
δ∗II
VII(δ) dδ −
∫ b1
3
δ∗III
VIII(δ) dδ
=
∫ b1
3
δ∗III
(VII(δ) − VIII(δ)) dδ +
∫ δ∗III
δ∗II
VII(δ) dδ dδ ≥ 0.
δII2
δIII2
hIII
hII
δIII1 δII1δ
∗
III
δ∗II
(a)
δII2
δIII2
hIII
hII
δIII1 δII1
δ∗IIIδ∗II
(b)
Figure B.18: Mechanism in Figure 2b (in dotted lines) superimposed on mechanism in
Figure 2c (in solid lines). Figure indicates the case when (a) (hII , δ
∗
II) < (hIII , δIII); (b)
(hII , δ
∗
II) < (hIII , δIII).
This proves that δ1 ≥ h+ δ∗, and also that a1 ≤ 1. We then verify the
upper bound δ1 ≤ b13 via Mathematica (see Appendix D.2(5)).
Step 3d: We now prove that δ2 ∈ [2b2−c3 , b23 ]. Suppose that δ2 < 2b2−c3 .
Then, from V (δ) = −(c− 2b2 +3δ2) + 3 δ2−hδ2+δ∗ (δ + δ2) when δ ∈ [−δ2, δ∗], we
have V ′(−δ2) = −(c−2b2+3δ2) > 0. Also, V ′(δ∗) ≥ 0 holds since h ≤ 2b2−c3 .
So we have V ′(δ) ≥ 0 when δ ∈ [− b23 , δ∗]. This implies that V (δ∗) > 0, a
contradiction. So we have δ2 ≥ 2b2−c3 ≥ h, and thus a2 ≤ 1. The upper
bound δ2 ≤ b23 is verified via Mathematica (see Appendix D.2(4)).
Step 4: We now proceed to prove that the conditions in Theorem 10 (2)–
(4) are satisfied. Observe from the expressions of V (δ) it is nonpositive when
δ ∈ [−b2, −b23 ] (i.e., in the interval where q1 = 0), and nonnegative when
δ ∈ [ b13 , b1] (i.e., in the interval where q1 = 1). This proves the conditions of
Theorem 10 (2) and 10 (4).
We now prove the conditions in Theorem 10 (3). The values of V ′(δ)
can be computed as
V ′(δ) =


−(c− 2b2 + 3δ2) + 3 δ2−hδ2+δ∗ (δ + δ2) δ ∈ (−δ2, δ∗]
−(c− 2b2)− 3 hδ1−δ∗ (δ1 − δ) δ ∈ [δ∗, b1 − b2)
−(c− 2b1 + 3δ) − 3 hδ1−δ∗ (δ1 − δ) δ ∈ (b1 − b2, δ1)
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The values of V ′(δ) when δ ∈ [−b2, δ2) ∪ (δ1, b1] is the same as (26).
The proof of
∫ x
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ ≥ 0 for every x ∈ [− b23 , δ∗], is the same as that
in the proof of Theorem 14. So we proceed to prove
∫ x
δ∗ V (δ) dδ ≥ 0 for every
x ∈ [δ∗, b13 ]. Observe that V ′(δ) is positive when δ ∈ [δ∗, b1 − b2) ∪ (δ1, b13 ].
This is because (i) V (δ∗) ≥ 0 since h ≤ 2b2−c3 , (ii) V ′(δ) increasing in the
interval [δ∗, b1− b2), and (iii) δ1 ≤ b13 . We now claim that V ′(δ) ≤ 0 in some
continuous subset of [b1 − b2, δ1]. This is because (i) V ′(δ) decreases in the
interval (b1 − b2, δ1), and so when V ′(δ) = 0 at some l1 ∈ [b1 − b2, δ1], then
V ′(δ) ≤ 0 for every δ ∈ [l1, δ1); (ii) if V ′(δ) > 0 for every δ ∈ (b1 − b2, δ1),
then V (δ) ≥ 0 throughout the interval, and thus ∫ b13δ∗ V (δ) dδ = 0 cannot be
true. We have proved the claim.
Combining the fact that V (δ∗) = V ( b13 ) =
∫ b1
3
δ∗ V (δ) = dδ = 0, with
V ′(δ) being nonnegative everywhere other than some continuous subset of
δ ∈ (b1− b2, δ1), it is now easy to see that
∫ x
δ∗ V (δ) dδ ≥ 0 for all x ∈ [δ∗, b13 ].

Proof of Theorem 16 (i):
Step 1: We compute the virtual valuation function for the mechanism
depicted in Figure 13.
V (δ) =


µ¯(Z) + 32δ
2 + 2b2δ +
b22
2 δ ∈ [−b2,−δ2]
V (−δ2)− (c− 2b2 + 3δ2)(δ + δ2) + 32 δ2δ1+δ2 (δ + δ2)2 δ ∈ [−δ2, δ1]
V (δ1) + 2b2(δ − δ1) δ ∈ [δ1, b′]
V (b′)− b1(δ − b1 + b2)− 32 ((b1 − δ)2 − b22) δ ∈ [b′, b1]
where b1 − b2 is denoted as b′.
Step 2: The mechanism has three unknowns – δ1, δ2 and a1. Since
q = ∇u, a conservative field, we must have the slope of the line separating
(0, 0) and (1 − a, a) allocation regions satisfying −1−aa = − δ2δ1 . This yields
a = δ1δ1+δ2 .
We now compute the other two parameters by equating µ¯(Z) = 0 and∫ b1
2
− b2
4
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ = 0. The latter condition follows from Theorem 10 3(c)
because q1(δ) = 1− a ∈ (0, 1) for δ ∈ [− b23 , b12 − b24 ].
µ¯(Z) = 0⇒ −3
2
δ1δ2 − c(δ1 + δ2) + b1b2 = 0. (B.7)
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∫ b1
2
− b2
4
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ = 0
⇒
∫ −δ2
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ +
∫ δ1
−δ2
V (δ) dδ +
∫ b1
2
− b2
4
δ1
V (δ) dδ = 0
⇒ b2(δ22 − b22/9) +
1
2
(b32/27 − δ32) +
b22
2
(b2/3− δ2)
− (3δ1δ2/2 + c(δ1 + δ2)− b22/2)(2b1 − b2 − 4δ1)/4 + b2(2b1 − b2)/4− b2δ21
− (2b2δ2 − 3δ22/2− b22/2)(δ1 + δ2)− (c− 2b2 + 2δ2)
(δ1 + δ2)
2
2
= 0
⇒ 2b
3
2
27
+
δ1 − δ2
2
(δ1δ2 + c(δ1 + δ2))− b2
16
(2b1 − b2)2 − (2b1 − b2)µ¯(Z)
4
= 0.
(B.8)
The values of δ1 and δ2 can be obtained by solving (B.7) and (B.8) simul-
taneously.
Step 3: We now evaluate the bounds on the variables in order to prove
the existence of a meaningful solution that solves (B.7) and (B.8). Specifi-
cally, we show that there exists a (δ1, δ2) ∈ [0, b12 − b24 ]× [0, b23 ], as a simulta-
neous solution to (B.7) and (B.8). We show as in Step 3 of proof of Theorem
13.
We have δ1|δ2 = b1b2−cδ2c+3δ2/2 and δ2|δ1 =
b1b2−cδ1
c+3δ1/2
from (B.7). It is clear
that δ2|δ1=x is continuous in x, and also monotonically decreases in x. That
δ2|δ1=0 = b1b2/c ≥ 0 is also clear. We now verify if δ2|δ1= b12 − b24 ≤
b2
3 .
Observe that c ≥ 3b2/2 from the statement of the theorem, since c = 3b2/2
makes the left-hand side of (19) positive. We use c ≥ 3b2/2 crucially in the
verification process.
b1b2 − c(b1/2 − b2/4)
c+ 3b1/4− 3b2/8 ≤
b1b2 − 3b2(b1/2− b2/4)/2
3b2/2 + 3b1/4 − 3b2/8 =
b1b2/4 + 3b
2
2/8
9b2/8 + 3b1/4
=
b2
3
,
where the inequality occurs because c ≥ 3b2/2 from the statement of the
theorem.
We now substitute ( b12 − b24 , δ2|δ1= b12 − b24 ) on the left-hand side of (B.8),
to obtain
−
(
(6b1 + b2)
2
864(6b1 − 3b2 + 8c)2
)
(72b21b2 + 144b1b
2
2 − 90b32 + (−36b21 + 84b1b2 + 399b22)c− (96b1 + 208b2)c2)
which is nonnegative for all c ≥ β. We now substitute (δ1|δ2=0, 0) to obtain
1
432
b2
c
(216b21b2 − 108b21c+ 108b1b2c+ 5b22c) ≥ 0
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for all c ≤ 216b21b2
108b21−108b1b2−5b22
. This shows that the left-hand side of (B.8)
is nonnegative at the entry points of the curve (δ1|δ2 , δ2) in the desired
rectangle.
We now substitute (0, δ2|δ1=0), and obtain
1
432
b2
c
(108b1b2c+ 5b
2
2c− 216b21b2 − 108b21c) ≤ 0
because (i) 108b1c(b2 − b1) ≤ 0 for b1 ≥ b2, and (ii) 5b22c ≤ 216b21b2 for
b1 ≥ 3b2/2 and c ≤ 243b2/38. We now substitute (δ1|δ2= b23 ,
b2
3 ), and obtain
b2(6b1 + b2)
2(5b22 + 12b2c− 12c2)
432(b2 + 2c)2
≤ 0
for c ≥ 3b2/2. Recall that c ≥ 3b2/2 holds from the theorem statement.
This shows that the left-hand side of (B.8) is nonpositive at the exit points
of the curve (δ1|δ2 , δ2) in the desired rectangle.
We have thus shown that there exists (δ1, δ2) ∈ [0, b12 − b24 ] × [0, b23 ]
that solves (B.7) and (B.8) simultaneously for all values of (c, b1, b2) on the
statement of the theorem.
Step 4: We now proceed to prove that the conditions in Theorem 10
(2)–(4) are satisfied. Observe that V ′(δ) changes its sign from negative to
positive only at δ = −2b23 in the interval where q1 = 0, and from positive
to negative only at δ = max(2b13 , b1 − b2) in the interval where q1 = 1. The
proof of parts (2) and (4) now traces the same steps as in Theorem 13.
Similarly, the proof that
∫ x
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ ≥ 0 holds for every x ∈ [− b23 , b12 − b24 ],
is the same as in Theorem 14. This completes the proof of optimality of the
mechanism in Figure 2f.
At c =
216b21b2
108b21−108b1b2−5b22
, we obtain δ2 = 0, when we solve (B.7) and
(B.8) simultaneously. A transition thus occurs from the structure depicted
in Figure 2f to that in Figure 2g. We now show that the optimal mechanism
as depicted in Figure 15, when c ≥ 216b21b2
108b21−108b1b2−5b22
.
Step 1: We first consider the zero allocation region to be Z = ([c, c +
b1b2
c ], c), and compute the virtual valuation function as follows.
V (δ) =


µ¯(Z) + 32δ
2 + 2b2δ +
b22
2 δ ∈ [−b2, 0]
V (0) − (c− 2b2)δ δ ∈ [0, b1b2c ]
V ( b1b2c ) + 2b2(δ − b1b2c ) δ ∈ [ b1b2c , b′]
V (b′)− b1(δ − b1 + b2)− 32((b1 − δ)2 − b22) δ ∈ [b′, b2]
where b1 − b2 is denoted by b′. Observe that the zero allocation region only
consists of a portion of the bottom boundary. So when we modify q(z)
to be (0, 1) instead of (0, 0) for every z ∈ Z, the utility u(z) remains the
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same for every z ∈ D. The expected revenue, Ez∼f [z · q(z) − u(z)], also
remains unchanged, because
∫
Z f(z) dz = 0. So we continue our analysis of
the mechanism in Figure 2g, assuming the zero allocation region Z to be
non-empty.
The mechanism does not have any unknowns to compute. So steps 2
and 3 are not necessary. We move straightaway to step 4.
Step 4: We now prove that the conditions in Theorem 10 (2) and 10
(4) are satisfied. Since V ′(δ) changes sign from positive to negative only at
δ = max(2b13 , b1− b2) in the interval where q1 = 1, the proof for Theorem 10
(4) traces the same steps as in Theorem 13. But V ′(δ) changes sign at three
values of δ in the interval where q1 = 0. So proving the other condition
needs more work.
We have V (−b2) = V (− b23 ) = 0, and V (δ) ≤ 0 when δ ∈ [−b2,− b23 ]. We
now evaluate
∫ b1
2
− b2
4
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ.
∫ b1
2
− b2
4
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ =
2
27
b32 +
b21b
2
2
2c
− 1
16
b2(2b1 − b2)2 ≤ 0 (B.9)
when c ≥ 216b21b2
108b21−108b1b2−5b22
. So we have
∫ b1
2
− b2
4
−b2 V (δ) dδ ≤ 0.
Observe that V (δ) is negative when δ ∈ [−b2,− b23 ], positive when δ ∈
[− b23 ,
b22
2(c−2b2) ], and negative again when δ ∈ [
b22
2(c−2b2) ,
b1
2 − b24 ]. So the integral∫ x
−b2 V (δ) dδ thus attains its minimum either at −
b2
3 or at
b1
2 − b24 . But from
(B.9), we have
∫ b1
2
− b2
4
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ ≤ 0, and so the minimum cannot occur at
− b23 . Therefore,
∫ x
−b2 V (δ) dδ ≥
∫ b1
2
− b2
4
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ holds for all x ∈ [−b2, b12 −
b2
4 ]. Hence the result. 
Proof of Theorem 16(ii): Consider case (ii), where b1 ∈ [b2, 3b2/2].
The values of V (δ) and the expression for µ¯(Z) = 0 are the same as in the
proof of Theorem 16(i). We thus skip step 1.
Step 2: We now compute the expression for − ∫ b13− b2
3
V (δ) dδ = 0.
−
∫ b1
3
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ = 0
⇒ −
∫ −δ2
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ −
∫ δ1
−δ2
V (δ) dδ −
∫ b1−b2
δ1
V (δ) dδ −
∫ b1
3
b1−b2
V (δ) dδ = 0
⇒ 2
27
(b31 − b32)−
δ1 − δ2
2
(
b1b2 − δ1δ2
2
)
−
(
b1 − b2 − δ1 − δ2
2
)
µ¯(Z) = 0.
(B.10)
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The values of (δ1, δ2) can be obtained by solving (B.7) and (B.10) simulta-
neously.
Step 3: We evaluate the bounds on the variables in order to prove the
existence of a meaningful solution that solves (B.7) and (B.10). Specifically,
we show that there exists a (δ1, δ2) ∈ [0, b13 ] × [0, b23 ], as a simultaneous
solution to (B.7) and (B.10). Again, we show this as in Step 3 of proof of
Theorem 13.
We have δ1|δ2 = b1b2−cδ2c+3δ2/2 and δ2|δ1 =
b1b2−cδ1
c+3δ1/2
from (B.7). It is clear
that δ2|δ1=x is continuous in x, and also monotonically decreases in x. That
δ2|δ1=0 = b1b2/c ≥ 0 is also clear. We now verify if δ2|δ1= b13 ≤
b2
3 for all
c ≥ α2.
We first observe from Mathematica that α2 ≥ 1.36b2+2(t−1.36)(b1−b2),
with t = 3(37 + 3
√
465)/176 (see Appendix D.2(7)). We now show that
1.36b2 + 2(t − 1.36)(b1 − b2) ≥ 52 b1b2b1+b2 . This is same as showing that 4(t −
1.36)b21 − 2.28b1b2+ (2.72− 4(t− 1.36))b22 ≥ 0, which is clearly true since (i)
the roots of this quadratic expression are imaginary, and (ii) the coefficients
of b21 term and b
2
2 term are positive. We thus verify if δ2|δ1= b13 ≤
b2
3 for all
c ≥ 52 b1b2b1+b2 .
b1b2 − cb1/3
c+ b1/2
≤ b1b2 − 5b1(b1b2)/(6(b1 + b2))
5b1b2/(2(b1 + b2)) + b1/2
=
b21b2/6 + b1b
2
2
3b1b2 + b21/2
=
b2
3
,
where the inequality occurs because of c ≥ 52 b1b2b1+b2 .
We substitute ( b13 , δ2|δ1= b13 ) on the left-hand side of (B.10), to obtain
4b51 − 16b1b32c− 16b32c2 + b41(−6b2 + 15c)
54(b1 + 2c)2
+
12b31(3b
2
2 − 3b2c+ c2)− 4b21b2(b22 − 27b2c+ 18c2)
54(b1 + 2c)2
We now verify if this expression is nonpositive for every c ≥ α2, b1 ∈
[b2, 3b2/2]. (Recall that α2 ≥ 1.36b2 + 2(t − 1.36)(b1 − b2)). We now prove
that the expression is nonpositive when c = 1.36b2 + 2(t − 1.36)(b1 − b2),
b1 ∈ [b2, 3b2/2], and that it is decreasing in c. Substituting c = 1.36b2 +
2(t− 1.36)(b1 − b2), we have
(21.8931)b51 − (52.8447)b41b2 + (33.1421)b31b22
+ (14.2829)b21b
3
2 − (24.4661)b1b42 − (6.01705)b52 ≤ 0
for b1 ∈ [b2, 3b2/2]. Differentiating the numerator with respect to c, we have
−16b1b32 − 32b32c+ 15b41 − 36b31b2 + 108b21b2(b2 − c) + 24b21c(b1 − 3b2/2) ≤ 0
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for every c ≥ b2, b1 ∈ [b2, 3b2/2]. We now substitute (δ1|δ2=0, 0) in (B.10)
to obtain 2/27(b31 − b32)− b21b22/(2c) ≤ 0 when c ≤ 27b
2
1b
2
2
4(b31−b32)
. This shows that
the left-hand side of (B.10) is nonpositive at the entry points of the curve
(δ1|δ2 , δ2) in the desired rectangle.
When δ1 = 0, we have δ2 = b1b2/c, and thus substituting (0, δ2|δ1=0) on
the left-hand side of (B.10), we get 2(b31 − b32)/27 + (b1b2)2/(2c) ≥ 0. We
now substitute (δ1|δ2= b23 ,
b2
3 ), to obtain
4b31(b2 + 2c)
2 − 36b21b22(b2 + 3c) + 6b1b22(b22 + 6b2c+ 12c2)
54(b− 2 + 2c)2
− b
3
2(4b
2
2 + 15b2c+ 12c
2)
54(b2 + 2c)2
We now verify if this expression is nonnegative for every c ≥ α2, b1 ∈
[b2, 3b2/2]. We verify this for c ≥ 1.36b2 + 2(t − 1.36)(b1 − b2), and prove
that it is increasing in c. Substituting c = 1.36b2 + 2(t − 1.36)(b1 − b2), we
have
(8.92237)b51 + (26.6023)b
4
1b2 − (20.6703)b31b22
− (16.0947)b21b32 + (32.9614)b1b42 − (17.7114)b52 ≥ 0
for every b1 ≥ b2. Differentiating the numerator with respect to c, we get
16b31(b2 + 2c) + 36b1b
3
2 − 15b42 + 108b1b22(c− b1) + 24b22c(3b1/2 − b2) ≥ 0
when c ≥ b1 ≥ b2. This shows that the left-hand side of (B.10) is nonnegative
at the exit points of the curve (δ1|δ2 , δ2) in the desired rectangle.
We have thus shown that there exists (δ1, δ2) ∈ [0, b13 ]× [0, b23 ] that solves
(B.7) and (B.10) simultaneously for all values of (c, b1, b2) in the statement
of the theorem.
Step 4: We now prove the conditions of Theorem 10(b)–(d) are satisfied.
Observe that V ′(δ) changes its sign from negative to positive only at δ =
−2b23 in the interval where q1 = 0, and from positive to negative only at
δ = 2b13 in the interval where q1 = 1. The proof of parts (2) and (4) now
traces the same steps as in Theorem 13.
It only remains to prove that
∫ x
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ ≥ 0 holds for every x ∈
[− b23 , b13 ]. We consider two cases: (a) c ≥ 2b2, (b) c ∈ [α2, 2b2]. Consider
case (a). We have V ′(δ) ≥ 0 when δ ∈ [− b23 ,−δ2], V ′(δ) ≤ 0 when δ ∈
[−δ2, δ1] (since c ≥ 2b2), and V ′(δ) ≥ 0 when δ ∈ [δ1, b13 ]. We also have
V (− b23 ) = V ( b13 ) = 0. It follows that V (δ) ≥ 0 when δ ∈ [− b23 , b13 ], and∫ x
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ ≥ ∫ b13− b2
3
V (δ) dδ ≥ 0 for every x ∈ [− b23 , b13 ].
In case (b), we prove
∫ x
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ ≥ 0 holds for every x ∈ [− b23 , b13 ],
by comparing the mechanism in Figure 2d with that in Figure 2c. We first
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prove that (δIV1 , δ
IV
2 ) obtained by solving (B.7) and (B.10) in the mechanism
depicted in Figure 2d, is at most the value of (δIII1 , δ
III
2 ) values obtained
in Figure 2c. We then argue that
∫ x
− b2
3
(VIV (δ) − VIII(δ)) ≥ 0 for every
x ∈ [ b23 , b13 ]. Since we know that condition 3d in Theorem 10 holds for the
mechanism in Figure 2c, the proof is complete.
(1
−
a 2
, a
2
)
(a
1
, 1
−
a 1
)
(1−
a, a)
δIII1 δ
IV
1
δIV2
δIII2
(a)
(1
−
a 2
, a
2
)
(a
1
, 1
−
a 1
)
(1−
a, a)
δIV1 δ
III
1
δIV2
δIII2
(b)
(1
−
a 2
, a
2
)
(a
1
, 1
−
a 1
)
(1−
a, a)
δIV1 δ
III
1
δIII2
δIV2
(c)
Figure B.19: The mechanisms in Figures 2c and 2d superimposed on each other, when
(a) (δIII1 , δ
III
2 ) < (δ
IV
1 , δ
IV
2 ); (b) δ
III
1 > δ
IV
1 , and δ
III
2 < δ
IV
2 ; (c) (δ
III
1 , δ
III
2 ) > (δ
IV
1 , δ
IV
2 ).
The mechanism in Figure 2c is denoted by dotted lines, and that in Figure 2d by solid
lines.
We now prove that (δIV1 , δ
IV
2 ) < (δ
III
1 , δ
III
2 ). Suppose not. We have two
cases: (i) (δIV1 , δ
IV
2 ) > (δ
III
1 , δ
III
2 ), (ii) One of (δ
IV
1 , δ
IV
2 ), say δ
IV
2 , is greater
than δIII2 . From Mathematica, we have a1 + a2 < 1 when c ∈ [α2, 2b2)
(see Appendix D.2(6)). Thus the mechanisms depicted in Figures 2b and
2d appear as in Figure B.19a for case (i), and as in Figure B.19b for case
(ii).
Consider case (i). We have µ¯III(Z) = µ¯IV (Z) − a negative number >
µ¯III(Z). So µ¯(Z) = 0 cannot hold simultaneously for both the mechanisms,
a contradiction. Consider case (ii). We then have V ′III(δ) > V
′
IV (δ) for
δ ∈ (−δIV2 , l1) for some l1 ∈ [−δIII2 , δIV1 ], V ′III(δ) < V ′IV (δ) for δ ∈ (l1, δIII1 ),
and V ′III(δ) = V
′
III(δ) for δ ∈ [− b23 ,−δIV2 ] ∪ {l1} ∪ [δIII1 , b13 ]. We also have
VIII(− b23 ) = VIII( b13 ) = VIV (− b23 ) = VIV ( b13 ) = 0. So VIII(δ) − VIV (δ) =
VIII(− b23 )− VIV (− b23 ) +
∫ δ
− b2
3
(V ′III(δ˜)− V ′IV (δ˜)) dδ˜ > 0 for all δ ∈ (− b23 , b13 ).
Thus
∫ b1
3
− b2
3
(VIII(δ) − VIV (δ)) dδ > 0, a contradiction. We have proved our
claim.
We thus have (δIII1 , δ
III
2 ) > (δ
IV
1 , δ
IV
2 ), and the mechanisms appear as
in Figure B.19c. We have V ′III(δ) < V
′
IV (δ) for δ ∈ (−δIII2 , l1) ∪ (l2, δIII1 )
for some l1 ∈ [−δIV2 , δIV1 ] and l2 ∈ [l1, δIV1 ], V ′III(δ) > V ′IV (δ) for δ ∈ (l1, l2),
and V ′III(δ) = V
′
III(δ) for δ ∈ [− b23 ,−δIII2 ] ∪ {l1, l2} ∪ [δIII1 , b13 ]. We also
have VIII(− b23 ) = VIII( b13 ) = VIV (− b23 ) = VIV ( b13 ) =
∫ b1
3
− b2
3
VIII(δ) dδ =∫ b1
3
− b2
3
VIV (δ) dδ = 0. We now have a series of observations.
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• VIV (δ)−VIII(δ) = VIV (− b23 )−VIII(− b23 )+
∫ δ
− b2
3
(V ′IV (δ˜)−V ′III(δ˜)) dδ˜ ≥
0 when δ ∈ [− b23 , l1].
• VIV (δ)− VIII(δ) = VIV ( b13 )− VIII( b13 )−
∫ b1
3
δ (V
′
IV (δ˜)− V ′III(δ˜)) dδ˜ ≤ 0
when δ ∈ [l2, b13 ].
• By a similar argument, it is easy to see that VIV (δ) − VIII(δ) is non-
negative when δ ∈ [l1,m] for some m ∈ [l1, l2], and is nonpositive when
δ ∈ [m, l2]. We thus have VIV (δ) ≥ VIII(δ) when δ ∈ [− b23 ,m], and
VIV (δ) ≤ VIII(δ) when δ ∈ [m, b13 ].
• ∫ x− b2
3
(VIV (δ) − VIII(δ)) dδ ≥ 0 when x ∈ [− b23 ,m].
• ∫ x− b2
3
(VIV (δ) − VIII(δ)) dδ = −
∫ b1
3
x (VIV (δ) − VIII(δ)) dδ ≥ 0 for any
x ∈ [m, b13 ].
• Notice that ∫ x− b2
3
VIII(δ) dδ ≥ 0 holds for any x ∈ [− b23 , b13 ], and thus∫ x
− b2
3
VIV (δ) dδ ≥ 0 now follows.
This completes the proof of optimality of the mechanism depicted in 2d.
For the proof of optimality of the mechanism depicted in 2e when c ≥
27b21b
2
2
4(b31−b32)
, we note that the proof is exactly the same as in the proof of Theorem
16(i), except for the term
∫ b1
3
− b2
3
V (δ) dδ = 227 (b
3
2 − b31) + b
2
1b
2
2
2c . The expression
clearly is negative when c ≥ 27b21b22
4(b31−b32)
. 
Proof of Theorem 17: We fix c1−c2 = d. Observe that the domain of
the functions (q1, t) is the interval [d− b2, d− b1]. But it can be verified that
all the results hold even for a shifted version of the domain. So we redefine
δ = z1 − z2 − d, and retain the domain to be [−b2, b1].
Step 1: We compute the virtual valuation function for the mechanism
depicted in Figure 9.
V (δ) =


µ¯(Z) + 32δ
2 + 2b2δ +
b22
2 + d(δ + b2) δ ∈ [−b2,−δ2]
V (δ2)− (c2 − 2b2 + 3δ2)(δ + δ2) δ ∈ [−δ2, δ∗]
V (δ∗)− (c2 − 2b2)(δ − δ∗) + 32((δ1 − δ)2 − δ22) δ ∈ [δ∗, b1 − b2]
V (b1 − b2)− (c1 − 2b1 + 3δ1)(δ − b1 + b2) δ ∈ [b1 − b2, δ1]
−32δ2 + 2b1δ −
b21
2 − d(δ − b1) δ ∈ [δ1, b1]
Step 2: The mechanism has three unknowns – δ∗, δ1, and δ2. Observe
that the line between the points (c1+ b2+ δ
∗, c2+ b2) and (c1+ δ∗, c2) passes
through (c1 + δ1, c2 + δ2). So we have δ
∗ = δ1 − δ2.
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We now proceed to compute δ1 and δ2. We do so by equating µ¯(Z) = 0
and V (δ∗) = 0. The latter follows from Theorem 10 because q1 = 0 for
δ ∈ [−b2, δ∗].
µ¯(Z) = 0⇒ −3δ1δ2 − c2δ1 − c1δ2 + b1b2 = 0. (B.11)
V (δ∗) = 0⇒ −3
2
δ22 + 2b2δ2 −
b22
2
− d(b2 − δ2) + (c2 − 2b2 + 3δ2)δ1 = 0.
(B.12)
The values of δ1 and δ2 can be computed by solving (B.11) and (B.12)
simultaneously.
Step 3: We now evaluate the bounds on δ1 and δ2 in order to prove
the existence of a meaningful solution that solves (B.11) and (B.12) simul-
taneously. Specifically, we show that there exists a (δ1, δ2) ∈ [ b12 − c13 +
c1c2
6b2
, 2b1−c13 ]× [ b2+2d3 , 2b2−c23 ] as a simultaneous solution to (B.11) and (B.12).
To show this, we do the following.
• We first show that there exists a (δ1, δ2) ∈ [ b12 − c13 + c1c26b2 ,
2b1−c1
3 ] ×
[ b2+2d3 ,
2b2−c2
3 ] satisfying (B.11). We do this by showing that (a) δ1|δ2=x
is continuous in x, and (b) δ1|δ2= 2b2−c23 =
b1
2 − c13 − c1c26b2 . We further
show that in addition to continuity, δ1|δ2=x is also monotone; it de-
creases as x increases.
• It now suffices to show that the entry and the exit points of the curve
(δ1|δ2=x, x) in the rectangle [ b12 − c13 + c1c26b2 ,
2b1−c1
3 ] × [ b2+2d3 , 2b2−c23 ]
changes sign when substituted on the left-hand side of (21). The en-
try point clearly is ( b12 − c13 + c1c26b2 ,
2b2−c2
3 ). The exit point is either
(2b1−c13 , δ2|δ1= 2b1−c13 ) or (δ1|δ2= b2+2d3 ,
b2+2d
3 ). So we show that (a) sub-
stituting ( b12 − c13 + c1c26b2 ,
2b2−c2
3 ) on left-hand side of (B.12), makes the
expression nonnegative, and (b) substituting (2b1−c13 , δ2|δ1= 2b1−c13 ) or
(δ1|δ2= b2+2d3 ,
b2+2d
3 ) on left-hand side of (B.12), makes the expression
nonpositive.
We now fill in the details. We have δ1|δ2 = b1b2−c1δ23δ2+c2 and δ2|δ1 =
b1b2−c2δ1
3δ1+c1
from (20). It is clear that δ1|δ2=x is continuous in x, and also monotonically
decreases in x. That δ1|δ2= 2b2−c23 =
b1
2 − c13 − c1c26b2 can easily be computed
by substituting δ2 =
2b2−c2
3 .
We now consider the points (δ1|δ2= b2+2d3 ,
b2+2d
3 ) and (δ1|δ2= 2b2−c23 ,
2b2−c2
3 ).
Substituting δ1 =
b1b2−c1δ2
3δ2+c2
from (B.11) in (B.12), we obtain
− 9δ32 − δ22(9c2 − 12b2)− δ2(2c22 − 10b2c2 + 2b2c1 + 3b22 − 6b1b2)
− b22c2 + 2b1b2c2 − 4b1b22 − 2b2c2(c1 − c2) = 0. (B.13)
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When δ2 =
2b2−c2
3 , the left-hand side of (B.13) equals
2
3b2(b2+ c2)(b2−2c1+
c2) ≥ 0 for 2c1 − c2 ≤ b2. Thus the expression is nonnegative at the entry
point.
When δ2 =
b2+2d
3 , the left-hand side of (B.13) equals −23(3b1b2− c1(b2+
2d))(b2 − 2c1 + c2) ≤ 0 for c1 ≤ b2, d ≤ b2/2, and 2c1 − c2 ≤ b2. Thus the
expression is nonpositive at the exit point (δ1|δ2= b2+2d3 ,
2b2+2d
3 ).
We now consider the point (2b1−c13 , δ2|δ1= 2b1−c13 ). Substituting δ2 =
b1b2−c2δ1
3δ1+c1
from (B.11) in (B.12), and obtain
− 36b2δ31 + (9b2(2b1 − b2) + 6b2(c2 − 7c1) + 3c22)δ21
+ (12b1b2(b2 + c1)− 2b2c1(3b2 + 8c1) + 8b2c1c2 + 2c1c22)δ1
− 3b21b22 + 4b1b22c1 + 2b1b2c21 − b22c21 − 2b2c31 − 2b1b2c1c2 + 2b2c21c2 = 0.
(B.14)
When δ1 =
2b1−c1
3 , the left-hand side of (B.14) equals
1
3(−8b31b2+2b1b2c1c2−
c21c
2
2 + b
2
1(3b
2
2 − 8b2c1 + 8b2c2 + 4c22)). We now prove that this expression is
nonpositive for all c1, c2 under consideration.
− 8b31b2 + 2b1b2c1c2 − c21c22 + b21(3b22 − 8b2(c1 − c2) + 4c22)
≤ −8b31b2 + 2b1b2c1c2 − c21c22 + b21(3b22 + 4c22)
≤ −8b31b2 + 4b21b22 + 4b21c22 ≤ −8b21b2(b1 − b2) ≤ 0
where the first inequality follows from c1 ≥ c2; the second inequality occurs
because the expression is maximized when c1 =
b1b2
c2
; the third inequality
follows because when c2 ∈ [0, b2], the expression is maximized at c2 = b2; and
the final inequality occurs since b1 ≥ b2. Thus the expression is nonpositive
at the exit point (2b1−c13 , δ2|δ1= 2b1−c13 ).
We have thus shown that there exists a (δ1, δ2) ∈ [ b12 − c13 + c1c26b2 , 2b1−c13 ]×
[ b2+2d3 ,
2b2−c2
3 ] as a simultaneous solution to (B.11) and (B.12), when the
values of (c1, c2, b1, b2) satisfy the conditions in the statement of the theorem.
Step 4: We now proceed to prove parts (c) and (d) in Theorem 10 (2)
and 10 (4). We first compute V ′(δ) for almost every δ ∈ [−b2, b1].
V ′(δ) =


3δ + 2b2 + d δ ∈ (−b2,−δ2)
−(c2 − 2b2 + 3δ2) δ ∈ (−δ2, δ∗]
−(c2 − 2b2)− 3(δ1 − δ) δ ∈ [δ∗, b1 − b2)
−(c1 − 2b1 + 3δ1) δ ∈ (b1 − b2, δ1)
−3δ + 2b1 − d δ ∈ (δ1, b1)
Observe that V ′(δ) is negative when δ ∈ [−b2,−2b2+d3 ], and positive when
δ ∈ [−2b2+d3 ,−δ2] (follows because δ2 ≤ 2b2−c23 ). We also have V (−b2) =
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V (δ∗) = 0. So V (δ) = V (−b2) +
∫ δ
−b2 V
′(δ˜) dδ˜ ≤ 0 for all δ ∈ [−b2, δ∗], and
hence
∫ δ∗
−b2 V (δ) dδ ≤ 0, and
∫ x
−b2 V (δ) dδ ≥
∫ δ∗
−b2 V (δ) dδ for all x ∈ [−b2, δ∗].
We now claim that V ′(δ) is positive when δ ∈ [δ∗, 2b1−d3 ], and negative
when δ ∈ [2b1−d3 , b1]. Observe that V ′(δ) is continuous at δ = δ∗, and that
it increases in the interval [δ∗, b1 − b2]. So V ′(δ) ≥ 0 when δ ∈ [δ∗, b1 − b2].
Also, V ′(δ) ≥ 0 when δ ∈ [b1 − b2, δ1] because δ1 ≤ 2b1−c13 . That V ′(δ) is
positive when δ ∈ [δ1, 2b1−d3 ], and negative when δ ∈ [2b1−d3 , b1] is obvious.
We have proved our claim.
Since we also have V (b1) = 0 = V (δ
∗), it follows that V (δ) = V (δ∗) +∫ δ
δ∗ V
′(δ˜) dδ˜ ≥ 0 for all δ ∈ [δ∗, b1]. So we have
∫ b1
δ∗ V (δ) dδ ≥ 0 and∫ x
δ∗ V (δ) dδ ≤
∫ b1
δ∗ V (δ) dδ for all x ∈ [δ∗, b1]. 
Appendix C. The Weak Duality Result
In this section, we show the weak duality relationship between (5) and
(4). Take the primal problem
max
u(z)−u(z′)≤‖z−z′‖∞
u cont, conv, inc
∫
D
u(z) dµ¯(z)
and rewrite it as
max
(u cont, conv, inc)
min
γ≥0
∫
D
u(z) dµ¯(z)+
∫
D×D
(‖z−z′‖∞−u(z)+u(z′)) dγ(z, z′).
We can do this because if u(z) − u(z′) > ‖z − z′‖∞, then the minimizer
can choose an adverse γ to make the second integral approach −∞. The
maximizer would not want this to happen and would hence choose u to
ensure that u(z) − u(z′) ≤ ‖z − z′‖∞ for all pairs z, z′ in D. The quantity
dγ(z, z′) is then a price measure for violating the constraint u(z) − u(z′) ≤
‖z − z′‖∞.
Let us now write the dual:
min
γ≥0
max
(u cont, conv, inc)
∫
D
u(z) dµ¯(z)+
∫
D×D
(‖z−z′‖∞−u(z)+u(z′)) dγ(z, z′).
Define γ1(z) =
∫
D γ(z, dz
′) and γ2(z′) =
∫
D γ(dz, z
′). Now rewrite the dual
as
min
γ≥0
max
(u cont, conv, inc)
∫
D
u(z) d(µ¯(z)−(γ1(z)−γ2(z)))+
∫
D×D
‖z−z′‖∞ dγ(z, z′)
and recognize it to be
min
γ:γ1−γ2cvxµ¯
∫
D×D
‖z − z′‖∞ dγ(z, z′).
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This is because if γ satisfied γ1 − γ2 cvx µ¯, then the maximizer can choose
an adversarial u with
∫
D u(z) d(µ¯(z) − (γ1(z) − γ2(z))) > 0, and drive the
first integral to ∞.
This establishes weak duality and provides us with some understanding
of how the dual arises and why γ may be interpreted as prices for violating
the primal constraint.
Appendix D. Proofs using Mathematica
Appendix D.1. Expressions used in Theorem 14
1. We first find the expression for h that solves (14) and (15) simultane-
ously.
Mathematica Input:
δ∗ = (b1b2− b22/2− 3h2/2− ch)/(2b2);
Solve[27(c+h+δ∗)(b2+δ
∗)2−4(4b2+3δ∗)(3/2(h+δ∗)+c)2 ==
0, h]
Mathematica Output:
{{h→ Root[−72b21b32 − 144b1b42 +90b52 +36b21b22c− 84b1b32c− 399b42c+
96b1b
2
2c
2 + 208b32c
2 + (108b21b
2
2 + 36b1b
3
2 − 477b42 + 432b1b22c+ 768b32c−
72b1b2c
2+84b22c
2− 96b2c3)#1+ (432b1b22+684b32− 324b1b2c+90b22c−
504b2c
2+36c3)#12+(−324b1b2−54b22−864b2c+216c2)#13+(−486b2+
405c)#14 + 243#15&, 1]} (all five roots)}
In this subsection, we verify (i) δ2 ≤ b2/3 when b1 ≥ b2, c ∈ [b2, 2b2],
(ii) the left-hand side of (16) is nonnegative when b1 ∈ [b2, 3b2/2],
c ∈ [b2, α1], and (iii) 2(t − 1)(b1 − b2) + b2 ≥ α1, where t = 3(37 +
3
√
465)/176. We will use bullet (1) above.
2. We now proceed to verify if δ2 ≤ b2/3. From (32), we have δ2 =
b1b2−(3h/2+c)(h+δ∗)
3/2(h+δ∗)+c . Observe that this is in terms of (h, δ
∗) that are ob-
tained by solving (14) and (15). We thus initialize the values of h and
δ∗ using expressions from bullet (1) above, and then find the values of
(c, b1, b2) for which δ2 ≤ b23 holds.
Mathematica Input:
h = Root[−72b21b32 − 144b1b42 + 90b52 + 36b21b22c − 84b1b32c −
399b42c + 96b1b
2
2c
2 + 208b32c
2 + (108b21b
2
2 + 36b1b
3
2 − 477b42 +
432b1b
2
2c+768b
3
2c−72b1b2c2+84b22c2−96b2c3)#1+(432b1b22+
684b32− 324b1b2c+90b22c− 504b2c2+36c3)#12+(−324b1b2−
54b22−864b2c+216c2)#13+(−486b2+405c)#14+243#15&, 3];
δ∗ = (b1b2−3/2h2−ch−b22/2)/(2b2); δ2 = b1b2(3h/2+c)(h+
δ∗)/(3(h+ δ∗)/2+ c);
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Reduce[δ2 ≤ b2/3&&0 ≤ b2 ≤ b1&& b2 ≤ c ≤ 2b2, {b2, b1, c}]
Mathematica Output:
b2 > 0&& b1 ≥ b2&& b2 ≤ c ≤ 2b2
The output indicates that δ2 ≤ b2/3 holds for every b1 ≥ b2, c ∈
[b2, 2b2].
3. We then find the values of c for which the left-hand side of (16) is
nonnegative.
Mathematica Input:
Reduce[−2b31/27− b2(δ∗)2 + b2δ∗(b1 − b2/2) + (c+ h)h2/2 ≥
0&&0 ≤ b2 ≤ b1 ≤ 3b2/2&& b2 ≤ c ≤ tb2, {b2, b1, c}]
Mathematica Output:
b2 > 0&& b2 ≤ b1 ≤ 1.5b2&& b2 ≤ c ≤ Root[fc−II(c)&, 2]
Here, fc−II(c) is a polynomial of degree 12. We have not written it here
since it is too long. Let α1 = Root[fc−II(c)&, 2]. Then this proves
that the left-hand side of (16) is nonnegative for every c ∈ [b2, α1].
4. To prove that α1 ≤ 2(t− 1)(b1− b2)+ b2, with t = 3(37+3
√
465)/176,
we again find the values of c for which the left-hand side of (16) is
nonnegative, but with c restricted to c ∈ [b2, 2(t− 1)(b1 − b2) + b2].
Mathematica Input:
t = 3
176
(37 + 3
√
465);Reduce[−2b31/27 − b2(δ∗)2 + b2δ∗(b1 −
b2/2) + (c+ h)h
2/2 ≥ 0&&0 ≤ b2 ≤ b1 ≤ 3b2/2&& b2 ≤ c ≤
2(t− 1)(b1− b2) + b2, {b2, b1, c}]
Mathematica Output:
b2 > 0&& b2 ≤ b1 ≤ 1.5b2&& b2 ≤ c ≤ Root[fc−II(c)&, 2]
This proves that α ≤ 2(t − 1)(b1 − b2) + b2. This completes all the
proofs in Theorem 14.
Appendix D.2. Expressions used in Theorem 15:
1. We first prove that the left-hand side of (15) is nonnegative when
(h, δ∗) = (0, δ∗|h=0).
Mathematica Input:
δ∗ = b1
2
− b2
4
− (3b2−2b1)
√
3b2c(8b1−3b2)(2b2−c)
(36b2(2b2−c))
;
t = 3(37+3
√
465)/176;Reduce[27b22c−16b2c2+(27b22+6b2c−
12c2)δ∗ + (18b2− 9c)(δ∗)2 ≥ 0&&0 ≤ b2 ≤ b1 ≤ 1.5b2&& b2 ≤
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c ≤ 2(t− 1.4b2)(b1− b2) + 1.4b2, {b2, b1, c}]
Mathematica Output:
b2 > 0&& b2 ≤ b1 ≤ 1.5b2&& b2 ≤ c ≤ 0.66676b1 + 0.73324b2
2. We now prove that the left-hand side of (15) is nonnegative when
(h, δ∗) = (h|δ∗=b1−b2 , b1 − b2).
Mathematica Input:
h =
9b2
2
−4c(b1+3b2)+3b2
√
9b2
2
+4c(b1+3b2)
6(b1+3b2)
;
Reduce[(27b21(b1−b2+c+h)−(3b1+b2)(3b1−3b2+2c+3h)2) ≥
0&&0 ≤ b2 ≤ b1 ≤ 1.5b2&& b2 ≤ c ≤ 2(t − 1.4)(b1 − b2) +
1.4b2,{b2, b1, c}]
Mathematica Output:
b2 > 0&& b2 ≤ b1 ≤ 1.5b2&& b2 ≤ c ≤ 0.66676b1 + 0.73324b2
3. We now find the expression for δ∗ that solves (15) and (17) simulta-
neously.
Mathematica Input:
h =
9b2
2
−16b2c−6δ∗(b2+2c)−9(δ∗)2
6(4b2+3δ∗)
+
3(b2+δ∗)
√
9b2
2
+16b2c+6δ∗(3b2+2c)+9(δ∗)2
6(4b2+3δ∗)
;
Solve
[
b1
2
− b2
4
− (3b2−2b1)(2c+3h)
12
√
(8b1−3b2)
(3b2(8b2(c+h)−(2c+3h)2))
== δ∗, δ∗]
Mathematica output:
{{δ∗ → −4b2/3}(twice), {δ∗ → Root[−16(b1 − b2)2b42(b21 − 3b1b2 +
b22)2c2 + (−4(b1 − b2)b32(b21 − 3b1b2 + b22)(108b21b32 − 108b1b42 + 27b52 +
24b31b2c + 96b
2
1b
2
2c − 96b1b32c + 24b42c + 16b31c2 − 24b21b2c2 + 44b1b22c2 −
16b32c
2))#1+(−144b61b42+4176b41b62−13752b31b72+15660b21b82−7218b1b92+
1152b120−256b61b32c+512b51b42c+4384b41b52c−18064b31b62c+21888b21b72c−
10368b1b
8
2c+1680b
9
2c−96b61b22c2+320b51b32c2−144b41b42c2−1392b31b52c2+
1884b21b
6
2c
2−768b1b72c2+96b82c2)#12+(−192b61b32+624b51b42+4128b41b52−
24828b31b
6
2 + 42984b
2
1b
7
2 − 27432b1b82 + 5580b92 − 224b61b22c + 768b51b32c +
4960b41b
4
2c−31904b31b52c+58680b21b62c−38808b1b72c+8064b82c−64b61b2c2+
96b51b
2
2c
2+1216b41b
3
2c
2−4120b31b42c2+7632b21b52c2−5056b1b62c2+1016b72c2)
#13+(−64b61b22+288b51b32+2400b41b42−20496b31b52+55512b21b62−52650b1b72+
14364b82 − 64b61b2c+288b51b22c+2688b41b32c− 23560b31b42c+69120b21b52c−
70320b1b
6
2c+20040b
7
2c−16b61c2+1344b41b22c2−3280b31b32c2+2592b21b42c2−
4020b1b
5
2c
2+1424b62c
2)#14+(576b41b
3
2−6864b31b42+33696b21b52−56628b1b62+
24696b72+576b
4
1b
2
2c−7152b31b32c+37584b21b42c−70380b1b52c+33360b62c+
432b41b2c
2 − 1560b31b22c2 − 5184b21b32c2 + 10224b1b42c2 − 2616b52c2)#15 +
68
(−576b31b32 +7776b21b42 − 32832b1b52 + 27396b62 − 576b31b22c+ 7776b21b32c−
36720b1b
4
2c+34272b
5
2c−432b31b2c2−2916b21b22c2+15876b1b32c2−9729b42c2)
#16+(−108b22(2b2+3c)(36b1b2−76b22−18b1c+29b2c))#17+(972b22(2b2−
c)(2b2 + 3c))#1
8 &, 1]} (all eight roots)};
We verify (i) δ2 ≤ b2/3 when b1 ∈ [b2, 3b2/2], c ∈ [b2, 2b2], (ii) δ1 ≤
b1/3 when b1 ∈ [b2, 3b2/2], c ∈ [b1, 2b2], (iii) the left-hand side of
(18) is nonnegative when b1 ∈ [b2, 3b2/2], c ∈ [b2, α2], and (iv) 2(t −
1.36)(b1 − b2) + 1.36b2 ≤ α2 ≤ 2(t − 1.4)(b1 − b2) + 1.4b2, where t =
3(37 + 3
√
465)/176. We will use bullet (3) above.
4. We now verify if δ2 ≤ b23 . From the statement of Theorem 15, we have
δ2 =
b22/2+(2b2−c−3h/2)δ∗
3(h+δ∗)/2+c . We now initialize (h, δ
∗) as in bullet (3), and
find the values of (c, b1, b2) for which δ2 ≤ b2/3.
Mathematica Input:
δ∗ = Root[−16(b1 − b2)2b42(b21 − 3b1b2 + b22)2c2 + (−4(b1 −
b2)b
3
2(b
2
1 − 3b1b2 + b22)(108b21b32 − 108b1b42 + 27b52 + 24b31b2c +
96b21b
2
2c − 96b1b32c + 24b42c + 16b31c2 − 24b21b2c2 + 44b1b22c2 −
16b32c
2))#1+(−144b61b42+4176b41b62−13752b31b72+15660b21b82−
7218b1b
9
2 +1152b
1
20− 256b61b32c+512b51b42c+ 4384b41b52c
−18064b31b62c+21888b21b72c−10368b1b82c+1680b92c−96b61b22c2+
320b51b
3
2c
2−144b41b42c2−1392b31b52c2+1884b21b62c2−768b1b72c2+
96b82c
2)#12 + (−192b61b32 + 624b51b42 + 4128b41b52 − 24828b31b62 +
42984b21b
7
2− 27432b1b82 +5580b92 − 224b61b22c+ 768b51b32c
+4960b41b
4
2c−31904b31b52c+58680b21b62c−38808b1b72c+8064b82c−
64b61b2c
2+96b51b
2
2c
2+1216b41b
3
2c
2− 4120b31b42c2+7632b21b52c2−
5056b1b
6
2c
2+1016b72c
2)#13+(−64b61b22+288b51b32+2400b41b42−
20496b31b
5
2 + 55512b
2
1b
6
2 − 52650b1b72 +14364b82 − 64b61b2c+
288b51b
2
2c+2688b
4
1b
3
2c−23560b31b42c+69120b21b52c−70320b1b62c+
20040b72c− 16b61c2 + 1344b41b22c2 − 3280b31b32c2 + 2592b21b42c2 −
4020b1b
5
2c
2+1424b62c
2)#14+(576b41b
3
2−6864b31b42+33696b21b52−
56628b1b
6
2 + 24696b
7
2 + 576b
4
1b
2
2c − 7152b31b32c + 37584b21b42c −
70380b1b
5
2c+33360b
6
2c+432b
4
1b2c
2−1560b31b22c2−5184b21b32c2+
10224b1b
4
2c
2− 2616b52c2)#15 + (−576b31b32 + 7776b21b42 −
32832b1b
5
2 + 27396b
6
2 − 576b31b22c + 7776b21b32c − 36720b1b42c +
34272b52c− 432b31b2c2− 2916b21b22c2+15876b1b32c2− 9729b42c2)
#16+(−108b22(2b2+3c)(36b1b2−76b22−18b1c+29b2c))#17+
(972b22(2b2− c)(2b2 + 3c))#18&, 5];
h =
9b2
2
−16b2c−6δ∗(b2+2c)−9(δ∗)2
6(4b2+3δ∗)
+
3(b2+δ∗)
√
9b2
2
+16b2c+6δ∗(3b2+2c)+9(δ∗)2
6(4b2+3δ∗)
;
δ2 =
b2
2
/2+(2b2−c−3h/2)δ∗
(3(h+δ∗)/2+c)
;
Reduce[δ2 − b2/3 ≤ 0&&0 ≤ b2 < b1 < 1.5b2&& b2 ≤ c <
2b2, {b2, b1, c}]
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Mathematica Output:
b2 > 0&& b2 < b1 < 1.5b2&& b2 ≤ c < 2b2
5. We now verify if δ1 ≤ b1/3. We use δ1 = δ∗ + b1b2−2b2δ
∗−b22/2
3h/2+c from the
statement of Theorem 15.
Mathematica Input:
δ1 = δ
∗ +
b1b2−2b2δ∗−b22/2
3h/2+c
;Reduce[δ1 − b1/3 ≤ 0&&0 ≤ b2 <
b1 < 1.5b2&& b1 ≤ c < 2b2, {b2, b1, c}]
Mathematica Output:
b2 > 0&& b2 < b1 < 1.5b2&& b1 ≤ c < 2b2
6. We now verify the monotonicity of q, i.e., verify if the left-hand side
of (18) is nonnegative when c ∈ [b2, α2].
Mathematica Input:
Reduce[(b22+4b2δ
∗−3δ∗h)(b22+4b2δ∗−2cδ∗−3δ∗h)−2b1b2(b22+
4b2δ
∗ − 2c(δ∗ + h) − 3h(2δ∗ + h)) ≥ 0&&0 ≤ b2 ≤ b1 ≤
1.5b2&& b2 ≤ c < 2b2,{b2, b1, c}]
Mathematica Output:
b2 > 0&& b2 ≤ b1 ≤ 1.5b2&& b2 ≤ c ≤ Root[fc−III(c)&, 3]
Here, fc−III(c) is a humongous polynomial running for several pages.
Define α2 := Root[fc−III(c)&, 3]. Then this proves that the left-hand
side of (18) is nonnegative for every c ∈ [b2, α2].
7. We finally verify the bounds on α2. We again find the values of c for
which the left-hand side of (18) is nonnegative, but with c restricted
to [2(t− 1.36)(b1 − b2) + 1.36b2, 2(t− 1.4)(b1 − b2) + 1.4b2].
Mathematica Input:
t = 3
176
(
37 + 3
√
465
)
;Reduce[(b22+4b2δ
∗−3δ∗h)(b22+4b2δ∗−
2cδ∗− 3δ∗h)− 2b1b2(b22+4b2δ∗− 2c(δ∗+ h)− 3h(2δ∗ +h))≥
0&&0 ≤ b2 ≤ b1 ≤ 1.5b2&&2(t−1.36)(b1−b2)+1.36b2 ≤ c ≤
2(t− 1.4)(b1− b2) + 1.4b2,{b2, b1, c}]
Mathematica Output:
b2 > 0&& b2 ≤ b1 ≤ 1.5b2
&&0.746758b1 + 0.613242b2 ≤ c ≤ Root[fc−III(c)&, 3]
This completes all the proofs in Theorem 15.
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